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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
Since World War Two, there has been a consistent effort
on the part of Western Europe to move towards Integration.

The idea, although not new, has for the first time found a

widespread enthusiasm among the nations within this sector
of Europe.

These nations, prodded by the two catastrophic

experiences of World War One and Two^ have sought ways of

overcoming the intense nationalism of the European States.
Their aim Is to

emphasize the commonality of these states

which enables them to take advantage of supra-national institutions and policies.
While the goal of political integration has received

overwhelming support, the issue of what methods to use in
pursuit of that goal has caused widespread disagreement.

In

other words, the question of ”How do we get there?” has been
more difficult to resolve than the question of ’’Where do
we want to go?”

those

wTho

Basically, the debate has centered around

argue for a ’’quick” solution (establishment of a

supra-national institution with political and economic powers
--meaning the subjugation of individual member-states* sovereignty to it) and those who advocate a ’’slow evolvement” of

political integration.

(A

slow and careful step-by-step

process starting with economic cooperation between states
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which finally evolves Into the final political
goal.)
No matter what the method of European Integration,
the

very existence of the concept poses very serious
problems
for those European nations who have committed themselves
to
the laws and policies of neutrality.

In this thesis, our

discussion will center around the problems faced by four of
these neutrals, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland.
We will be concerned with first the problems of these four

nations and neutrality In general and then with the more
specific Issue of European Integration.
The study is divided into three parts.
Is concerned with the concept of neutrality.

The first part
We will be

tracing the development of neutrality as an International
concept In practice as well as in law.

From there, we will

note the changes In neutrality that have come as a result of
the cold war.

At this point, we will explain the significant

differences between neutrality and neutralism or non-alliance.
The second part is a discussion and development of the

Individual policies of neutrality practised by the four States.
From this discussion, it is hoped to explain why each of these
four States took up the practice of neutrality in the first
place, and why,

In the face of the cold war, did they choose

to remain neutral.

The primary objective of this part is,

however, to illustrate that each of these four States practices
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a policy of neutrality relative to Its own Individual circum-

stance and political environment.
Finally, Part III Is concerned with the four neutrals

and their position vls-a-vls the Integration of Europe.

The

purpose of this discussion Is to explore under what circumstances these four nations are willing to take part In the

Integration movement.

The four States of .Austria, Finland,

Sweden and Switzerland were chosen specifically for this study
for several reasons. First, they are all neutral In the cold
war.

Secondly, they are all of a Western orientation.

Lastly,

and most Important to the discussion, they have all at some

point been faced with the dilemma of accepting or rejecting

membership In an European regional organization.

The circum-

stances surrounding their participation In these organizations
and Its Impact on their neutrality will hopefully Illuminate
the differences In the neutrality of these four nations.

They

should also give us some hint as to the difficulties faced by
the neutrals, as Europe moves toward political and economic

unity.

PART

I

NEUTRALITY AND NEUTRALISM

^

:

CHAPTER II

NEUTRALITY
Definite on of Neutrality .

The concept of neutrality,

like most concepts, has been defined and redefined by so

many authorities that to find one definition suitable to all
is practically impossible,

it is more difficult in the case

of neutrality because as the concept has developed over the

centuries, its meaning has changed.

Despite this difficulty,

there are several common features included in most definitions
of neutrality which can serve for definitional purposes with-

out becoming Involved in the intricacies of conceptual con-

struction.
It is generally agreed that neutrality means "keeping

out of war.'

1

Ernest Nys finds the term used in this sense of

non-participation in war as early as 1378.

This central theme

is to be found in most of the writers on neutrality regardless

of when they wrote.

Examples, of definitions of this sort

include
...in general the obligation of neutrality
consists In abstention from hostile acts toward
either belligerent
-Johann W. Textor-

Neutrality, in popular thought, means keeping
It is the condition of those yho
out of war.
while others are fighting.
peace
remain at
-Philip Jessup-
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In a more modern sense, neutrality Is a legal status

Involving certain rights and duties.

It may describe the

condition of non-participants In a war, or It may connote
the policy of keeping out of war.

In both aspects, it

assumes that war Is In existence.

L. Oppenhelm explains

the concept is this modern sense.

He defines neutrality as:

The attitude of impartiality adopted by
third states towards belligerents and
recognized by belligerents, such attitudes
creating rights and duties between the impartial state and the belligerents."

This definition presupposes that a third State at its own

option or volition can decide to adopt an attitude of impartiality at the outbreak of war.

This has, in fact, over time

become a well -accepted practice.
The one feature common in all these definitions is that

they all recognize the existence of war.

It is the definitions

embracing this condition which have persisted throughout time.

Neutrality is an attitude during a state of
war only . 4
-L. OppenhelmNeutrallty.

..

.assumes that war is in existence."
-Philip Jessup-

Given a hot war, every state that stays out
of it is

*

eo Ipso* neutral.

-Peter LyonIn order to bring these fragments of numerous definitions

together, this writer has chosen a definition which encompasses
all of these features and is fairly clear in its explanation
of the concept of neutrality.

°

7
7

Neutrality designates the conditions of
that State which, while war Is being carried
on between two or more other States, remains
outside of the struggle and strives to preserve with each of the belligerents so far
as possible the normal relations which it maintained with them before. So defined, neutrality represents a status half-way between war
and peace.
-Nicolas PolitlsFor the States which find themselves in such a position,

neutrality Implies a combination of rights and duties.

The

rights are those of peacetime, only they are more or less

altered by the occurrence of war.

The duties also arise as

a result of the fact of war.

Neutral nations then are those who, during a war, "take
no ones part, remaining friends common to both parties and

not favoring the armies of one of them to the prejudice of
o

the other.

Thus defined, let us now turn to a discussion of the

development of neutrality throughout history.
History of Neutral It;/ .
war Itself.

Neutrality Is probably as old as

There have always been some States which would

take no part in the quarrels of others.

In fact,

traces of

what was to be called during the past three centuries the

"law of neutrality" can be occasionally found In ancient
history, for Instance In Greece and India.
times, there was no place for neutrality.

In other ancient

Such was the case

during the rule of Rome where during a war third States had
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to declare themselves for or against Rome.

an ally or an enemy.

One was either

(The Elsenhower-Dulles policy of the

1950's on non-alignment was very similar.

However, Dulles found

neutrality repugnant on moral grounds, while It was a means
of protection for States during the Roman Rule.)

During the Middle Ages, the situation was basically the same
as a result of several factors retarding the development of

neutrality.
feudalism.

The first of these factors was the Influence of

Because of feudal obligations of the princes, they

were not free to choose between belligerency and neutrality.
The most that a vassal could do was to resist the power of his

overlord which, in many cases, just substituted a conflict with
his Lord for a conflict with his Lord's enemy.

A

second and

more important factor retarding the development of the concept
of neutrality was the overwhelming power and Influence of the

Church.

In its temporal aspects, the Church was a part of the

feudal system; thus, the above remarks apply to it.

As a

spiritual power, the Church strove at times to unite its
faithful against the enemies of the Church.

"One could not

be neutral in a conflict between God and the foes of God.”?

All Christian countries were summoned to fight the common
enemy.

War between two States was considered In principle as

a matter of general concern.

”No member of the Empire could

be disinterested In a conflict which disturbed the harmony of
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the community; no Christian could be Indifferent to the

struggles of the Church, or remain neutral in the wars of

Christianity against the infidels, or in those of orthodory
against heresy .” 10
A third retarding feature of the Middle Ages was the

distinction between a ’’just” war and an ’’unjust” war.
again,

Here

the spiritual influence of the Church was apparent.

The attempt to make this distinction was originally due to
the necessity of reconciling the pacifism of the Church with

support for the Emperor*

s

wars.

It became more or less

agreed that everybody should support a ’’just” war, and nobody an ’’unjust” one:

’’The

problem of ’neutrality* came to

be considered from the point of view of whether a war was

*Just* or ’unjust,’ and neutral duties toward a nation waging
a ’just’

war were measured differently from those which

existed towards a nation embarking on an ’unjust* war.”

i:

Neutrality as an institution of reciprocal rights and
duties between belligerents and non-belligerents has a com-

paratively recent origin.

It is mainly the result of poli-

tical and economic relations between nations in the last
three centuries.

It is here that the history of neutrality

reveals the mutual Influence of and close connection among:
(a)

the status of national sovereignty,, (b) the status of

war and (c) the status of neutrality.

10

The emergence of the nation-state means the recognition
of national sovereignty as supreme and, consequently, the right
of a nation to go to war.

"If sovereign States enjoy equal

status in law, the circumstances In which two States go to

war can be no concern of other equally sovereign States who
wish to remain outside such war.

Cnee one regards war as a

necessary condition of international life, and grants it a
status of legitimacy, one must also recognize the status of

neutrality."

It became necessary for the belligerents to

observe the principles of neutrality in order that the number
of their enemies was not increased, and the theatre of war

was localized.

"The belligerent soon found that his hands

were not free.

The annoyance of the enemy might be relished,

but that of third parties might lead to hostile alliances."^
The neutral looked for protection, especially those with

large merchant marines.

The first agreements between belli-

gerents and neutrals were made concerning the rights of
>

neutrals to trade during war.

A

study of treaties, state

papers and Juristic writings from the fifteenth century

through the eighteenth century leads to the conclusion that
this is the way in which the law of neutrality developed.

The treaties concerning trade and sea commerce between belli-

gerent and neutral became accepted practice in time of war
and were greatly expanded to include other rights and duties
of both neutrals and belligerents.

The most important duties
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of the neutrals which developed over this time
were abstention

from and Impartiality In war.

The most sacred right, of course

being the right to neutrality.
-As

is so often the case,

the discrepancy between the

theory of law and the practice of law concerning neutrality
and neutrals

1

rights was very great.

Laws governing the rights

of neutrals and belligerents were like all laws, determined
by those who had the power to enforce them.

In the nineteenth

century while the concept of neutrality was developing rapidly
In the legal sense, in actual practice, it was under great

strain from those who held the power Internationally.

Although

numerous treaties were made concerning trade and commerce rights
of neutrals on the sea,

Britain found it convenient most of the

time to break those treaties.

This was especially true when

she confronted agreements made between France and a neutral

concerning war supplies.

Britain was involved In a life and

death struggle with France, and since she held sway over the
seas,

she had no reservations about violating neutral-belli-

gerents rights

in respect to Interfering with sea commerce.

She simply had the power to withstand any sanctions which might
be placed against

her.

And It was Napoleon who declared

that ’’there are no neutrals,’’ as he swept across the continent
of Europe.

Ke,

too, had the power to deny any rights or duties

afforded to neutrals and belligerents.

Thus,

’’...the general

attitude towards neutrality is determined by the comparative
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strength or weakness of the International order at
any particular point of time." 1
It was and is subject to the rather
whimsical nature of governments, especially those who
hold
**

sway over international politics.

Even though by the start

of the twentieth century the laws of neutrality and neutral

rights and duties were for the most part coded into inter-

national law, the actual obedience

to those codes was at

times rather insignificant.*
The period after World War One saw many authorities

predicting the death of neutrality.

Because of the devast-

ating effect of the war on mankind, the creation of the League
of Nations, and the attempt to outlaw war, it was thought

that the status of neutrality would be abolished.

In fact,

the view was prevalent that a neutral shirks his share^of the

burden of humanity.
years.

Neutrality became very unpopular in those

However, as the failures of the League of Nations

became apparent, and the attempt to outlaw war proved futile,

neutrality took on new meaning as a desirable status in the
face of war.

As war approached in Europe in the late 1930* s,

the scramble for neutrality in the struggle was common.

*This was especially true during World War One. Before
the war, agreement had been reached on rules governing neutrals'
rights at sea. These were coded in the Declaration of London.
During the war, little, if any, actual obedience to this
Declaration was apparent. Neutral rights in commercial matters
were pretty much violated by the belligerents also. In total,
neutrality was thought of negatively during World War One.

1

.

.
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and Tuternat-i ona] law .

From Its beginning,

the codification of International law on neutrality has had
a profound effect on the nature of the concept.

Probably

the most significant codification was the Initial one result-

ing In the Console to del Mare; the establishment of rules

regulating wartime non-belllgerents and their rights at sea.
This was the first time that what had become common practice
at sea was set down In writing as law.

Up to that point,

there had existed only Individual treaty arrangements between
two nations concerning neutral and belligerent relations.

From this point on, the codification of laws of neutrality
at different points in time signified a general awareness and

acceptance by most nations of the development of neutrality
laws

The Importance of neutrality as an Institution of Inter-

national law did not come about until the nineteenth century
During this century, the development of International rules
of neutrality was due to three factors.. The most prominent

and Influential factor was the attitude of the United States
of America towards neutrality.

The strict adherence of the

United States to the codes of neutrality and the establish-

ment of new codes preventing American citizens from talcing
part In foreign quarrels laid the groundwork for the Erltlsh

Foreign Enlistment Act of 1818.

Also of great importance to international laws of
neutrality was the neutralization of Switzerland in 1815
and Belgium in 1831.

The significance of these events was

the establishment of a new concept in international law;

permanent neutrality to be acquiesced to by belligerents
in all wars.

The third factor was the Declaration of Paris

of I 856 which incorporated into International Law the rule

that neutral goods on enemy ships must not be seized, and

that blockades must be effective.

The continuance of the codification of laws of neutrality occurred up until the outbreak of World War One.

important of these was the Hague

Most

Convention of 1907 which

concerned Itself with the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
on Sea and on Land.

However, the failure to achieve British

ratification of these conventions meant, in actuality, the
non-adherence to them by anyone when war actually broke out.
This proved to be the case in the First World War.
The post-war period brought about radical changes in

neutrality in International Law.

Many thought that the es-

tablishment of the League of Nations and its collective
security system of keeping peace would make neutrality obsolete.
In a system where all members were by agreement responsible

for the actions of one, there was presumably no room for

abstention from collective action through neutrality.

It is

true that the Covenant of the League of Nations as a document
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of international law was a radical alteration of the tradi-

tional concept of neutrality.

But it did not abolish it,

and it was incoirect to think so.

"The correct view was

probably that while in some cases, namely, when resort to
war was not contrary to the Covenant, the latter had not

altered the law of neutrality.
it,

It had, without abolishing

vitally affected it in those cases in which members of

the League were bound or

under Article 16."^

authorized to apply sanctions

The Importance of the Covenant on

neutrality was that the Covenant-breaking belligerent was
deemed, by signing the Covenant in advance, to measures of

discrimination being applied against him by those members of
the League who did not elect to declare war upon him .

The second attempt of the post-war period to radically

change the concept of neutrality came in the ratification in
1928 of the Pact of Paris, or the "General Treaty for the

Renunciation of War."

Since the Treaty has no provisions for

the enforcement of its obligation to outlaw war, it does not

affect the law of neutrality directly.

In other words, given

the outbreak of war in violation of the Treaty, the tradi-

tional laws of neutrality would still apply.

However, there

is little doubt that by destroying the absolute sovereign

right of States to go to war "...the Treaty has provided a

starting-point for important changes in the law of neutrality."

1

^
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For,

as a rule,

"

...the outbreak of war will be due to a

violation of the Treaty on the part of at least one belligerent., The guilty belligerent, by breaking the Treaty,

violates the rights of signatories...” 1 ?
World War Two brought about the modification of

neutrality.

This was a result mainly of the United States’

willingness to change her status of neutrality a little at
a time.

Her Increased support of the Allied nations was

done not as a violation of her neutrality but as a policy
of self-defense.

In fact,

in the last stages of her neutrality

before entering the war, neutrality had come to mean that
sanctions against the aggressor nations were within the scope
of the concept, because war had been outlawed as a legal

Instrument of national policy.
Cut of these modifications came the concept of non-

belligerency.

This term applies to those States who are not

actively participating In the war, but who, for one reason
or another, are aiding In the war effort through material

and Ideological support.

Such was the position of Sweden

during World War Two.
The ratification of the United Nations Charter by a

number of States after World War Two signified yet another
change in the law of neutrality.

It is In many ways like

the Covenant of the League of Nations in that it also limits
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the right of a State to be neutral, yet does not abolish

neutrality altogether.

In principle, no member of the United

Rations is entitled to remain neutral in a war ’n which the

Security Council has found a particular State guilty of a

breach of peace or act of aggression.

Members lose all rights

to neutrality only under Article k2, which insists that

members declare war or take sanctions which are Intended as
war.

Here again under Collective Security, the right to remain

neutral has been given up for the sake of the Community.

Whether this new change from the traditional rights and duties
of neutrality will prevail in time of war is yet to be determined.

The post-war era beginning in 19^6 has seen many changes
in the concept of neutrality.

With the beginning of a new and

different type of war, the cold war, has come the emergence of
a

new concept, that of neutralism and non-alignment.

That this

new concept has roots in the traditions of neutrality is a
foregone conclusion.

But because the cold war is radically

different from the traditional ”hot war,” new definitions and
laws must be used to understand the concept of neutralism.
is to this subject that we now turn.

It

CHAPTER III

THE COLD WAR AND NEUTRALISM
The Cold War.

The years following the conclusion of the

Second World War were years of change on the International
scene.

First, came the creation of the United Nations and

Its collective security system.

Secondly, there was the

emergence of many new nations In the old colonial areas of

Asia and Africa, who because of their newly acquired independence brought a certain amount of hope and goodwill to a world

weary

of war.

However, the most important changes for the

world came as a result of the war itself.

The most significant

of these was the Introduction of the atomic bomb by the United

States.

The bombing of Japan

signaled the start of the

Age and all its ramifications for mankind.

Nuclear

The end of the war

also found the two super-powers of the world about to embark

upon a new concept of war, one that would cause a redefinition
of many traditional relationships and concepts, both legally

and politically.

This new concept of war which has since been

entitled the "cold war" has had a significant effect upon the
traditions of neutrality, primarily because of the previous
direct relationship that existed between neutrality and the
"hot war" or "shooting war."

However, before discussing these

changes, let us examine briefly the conditions which led the

world into the era of the cold war.
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The end of the war left the United States and the Soviet

Union as the Inheritors of International power.

Besides being

the sole possessor of the atomic weapon, the United States

had forces deployed from Southeast Asia to Central Europe.
Russia, on the other hand had

known to man In Eastern

amassed the largest land

array

Europe and was probing and pushing

Into Central and Southern Europe.

Although they had been

allies against the Germans, these two global powers were split
by many pre-existing antagonisms, some dating back as far as

1917.

Outstanding among these were the fundamental Ideolo-

gical

differences between Communism and Democracy.

Moreover,

during the war, each had, at one time or another, accused the
other of falling to carry his share of the war effort, thus

Increasing the distrust and antagonism between the two nations.
By the end of the war, these two troublesome, monolithic giants

were squared off against each other In Central Europe, each

with enough grievances against the other to start another war
and be able to justify Its actions.

However, due to the weari-

ness of war on both sides and skillful diplomacy at the allied
conferences, actual war was avoided.

Instead, each side

launched a war of propaganda and diplomatic maneuvers In the

attempt to extract certain concessions from the other side.
Finally, In 19^7, as a result of the Russian attempts In Eastern
Europe to solidify Its hold over those countries, both militarily
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and politically, the United States announced the beginning
of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, both of which

were designed to keep Communism from spreading Into the

United States* spheres of influence.

It is at this point

that most historians mark the beginning of the cold war.

It

Is also here that the need for defining and redefining new

and old conceptions of war becomes apparent.

Redefinition of the Concept of

’’War .”

We live today in a state of cold war, that
Is armed fear.
It is not peace that we are
having but a precarious equilibrium In which
dissension does not declare Itself because of
mutual fear, It is not a state of order; there
is no inward tranquility
-Dr. S. Radhakrl shnan-

A

The above statement relates to the situation after 19^7,

Both Russia and the United States scrambled to bolster their

causes by soliciting support from nations around the world.
t

They each promised economic and military aid to those nations

who would join them In an alliance against the other.

This

bi-polar power struggle has evolved into an ideological struggle
between the Bast and the West, Communism versus Democracy and
Left versus Right.
’’cold war”

Each has developed its instruments of

just as they had in the ’’shooting war.”

Instruments

such as propaganda, fear and distrust, threats of nuclear

annihilation, localized wars of intervention, economic and

military bribes and any other means short of actual

’’hot

war”

.
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are used.

For cold war Is Institutionally psychological

warfare, the aim of which Is to nourish an idea of war In
the minds of men.

The strategy is to enable the victor to

overpower a rival psychologically by the threat of ones
armed strength with a view to

matic victory.

winning a political or diplo-

It is neither war nor peace In the traditional

sense as defined by International Law.

Traditionally, "War

Is a contention between two or more States through their

armed forces, for the purpose of overpowering each other and

Imposing such conditions of peace as the victor pleases."''
Peace has been defined as the end of a shooting war, commencing

with the signing of a peace treaty.

On the other hand, cold

war is defined as:
....originating from mutual suspicion and
mistrust, (cold war) Is the contention in
peace-time between two or more States or
between rival Power blocs, conducted by a
show of strength and by diverse means short
of armed intervention, for the purpose of
psychologically overpowering each other and
b>r an extension of the respective political
spheres of influence, involving in its process
breaches of the principles of peaceful coexistence recognized by the United Nations
Charte^, thereby endangering the climate of
peace
-Roy Chowdhury-

From the distinction made above between "hot war" and
the new concept,

cold war, one can envisage the effect upon

traditional neutrality that such a change has.

Neutrality

under International Law was only applicable during an actual

22

shooting war .

Except for those States who were under perma-

nent neutrality (neutralized), the cold war meant for many
a drastic change In their foreign policy.

Many sought to

align themselves with one side or the other for protection
and. also to forestall aggression If and when a shooting war

started.

This was especially true of the small European

nations such as Belgium, The Netherlands and Denmark who,

though they were traditionally neutral, had had a

negative

experience with neutrality during the Nazi period and now
sought

alliance with the West.

However, other States,

among them many newly created States who were groping to

maintain their newly acquired independence, found It expedient to align themselves with neither side.. Thus, the con-

cept of non-alignment or neutralism was born as a counter

position to the cold war.

The new neutralist stance vis-a-

vis the cold war signaled a radical departure from the tra-

Let us now examine this change.

ditions of neutrality.

Neutralism .

As was discussed In Chapter II, neutrality

Implied that a country had been reduced merely to the role of
a spectator In global affairs,

that it was Isolated from the

events taking place In the rest of the world and that its

policies were based upon indifference to global Issues.
Neutralism, on the other hand, is described and connoted by
words such as ’’positive

11

and ’’dynamic" to emphasize that it
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ts not Isolation, and that it is active, not passive;

it is a position and policy of responsibility.

that

Tt does not

require a nation to steer a middle course between East and
West.

Neutralist nations do not accept the obligation of

equidistance as pertains to neutrality.

Neutralism implies

diplomatic freedom of action and choice with respect to the
cold war.

"Non-alignment is not to be identified with

isolationism, nor is it to be confused with any hypothetical

necessity of equal cooperation with the two blocs.
The customary language of a cold war neutralist reflects
the difference in emphasis from the traditional neutral in

time of war.

The neutral will tend to stress that there is

a legal right of States to be neutral under International Law.

The neutralist tends rather to stress that it is morally

right for any State to be neutralist, and that "world opinion"

endorses the rightness of neutralist policies.

Where the

neutral tends to talk more of law than morality, the neutralist

stresses morality over law.
All neutralists begin by rejecting emphatically the notion
that they should view the world from within the confines of a
cold war alliance,

"....the simple truth is that the neutralists

are no more pro-Russian than pro-American.

They are pro-peace.

They are convinced that the cold war, if it lasts long enough

must inevitably erupt into a hot one. "-5

In general, it may be

.
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said that, above all, neutralism implies diplomatic
freedom
of action or choice with respect to cold war contestants.

"To the wide-ranging leaders today who proclaim their

Independence, neutrality is not a declaration in advance of
a fixed position to be taken in case of war,

rights against belligerent encroachment.

expedient.

It is not passive but active.

or

a claim to

It is a political
It asserts that

each State is determined to go its own Independent way in

accordance with its own current estimate of its own interests,
and it expresses the hope of getting along with both sides
and doing business with both sides and perhaps of influencing

both sides and even of serving as a bridge to bring them

closer together."^
No neutralist claims that his cold war neutralism necess-

arily means that his own country would not become Involved
in a general "hot war."
is,

The present defense of neutralism

substantially, that it can help prevent war.

By playing

either a "third force" role in the bi -polar world or by acting
as a peacemaking intermediary, neutralist nations hope to

loosen the rigid alliance structures and relieve the tensions
of the cold war.

It is with this purpose in mind that neu-

tralist nations actively take part in global politics, rejecting the Isolation and impartiality of traditional neutrality

which they feel became outdated with the coming of the Nuclear
A ge
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There are other differences between the concepts
of

neutrality and neutralism, but they arise mostly as a
result of the Individual State's specific situation relative to its own interests.

This situation gives rise to

the practising of many different types of neutralism.

There are, however, essentially six types of neutralist

policy

which may be usefully distinguished.

policy may be practised by:
Laos),
(3)

(2)

(1)

a traditional neutral

A

neutralist

a neutralized State

(Austria,

(Sweden, Switzerland),

a buffer or former buffer (Finland, Afghanistan),

an erstwhile isolationist (Ireland, Saudia Arabia)

pioneer neutralist (India, Yugoslavia), and
neutral (Eygpt, Iraq, Nigeria).

(6)

,

(4)

(5)

a

a new State

It may seem to be contra-

dictory to place traditional neutrals and neutralized States

under the broad category of neutralism, yet, given the

Nuclear Age
gence of the

and all its ramifications for war and the emer-

concept of psychological warfare embodied in

the cold war, one can no longer

existed previously.

follow the guidelines which

The norms of tradtional war and neu-

trality no longer exist, and even those States who have

traditions of neutrality or neutralization have had to adjust
their positions and policies to the given circumstances.
they have done and, therefore, they each practise, to some
degree, policies consistent with neutralism.

This
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Of the six types listed above, three of them pertain
to

the four European nations considered In this study.

Austria

Is a State which was neutralized, by treaty agreement In
1955.

Sweden and Switzerland can be considered traditional neutrals
since they have both held to the status of neutrality during
the "hot wars" of the twentieth century.

Finally, because of

her geographic position, next to the Soviet Union, Finland
Is considered a buffer State.

(Although not In the same

sense as the Eastern European biiffer States, because she has

been able to thwart Soviet attempts to undermine her democratic Institutions and, thus,

keep relatively free of

Soviet Influence domestically.)
Fart II of this study will be concerned with exploring
the particular policies of neutralism as practised by these

four nations.

Cur concentration will be focused on the

specific reasons for such a policy and the guidelines which
they have established for their neutralism.

PART II

FOUR EUROPEAN NEUTRALS:
SWEDEN, FINLAND, SWITZERLAND AND AUSTRIA

CRAFTER IV

SWEDEN AND NEUTRALITY
History

.

The beginnings of Swedish neutrality date

bacl<

over one hundred and fifty years to the end of the Napoleonic
wars.

Since 1814, Sweden has not participated In any war or

joined any alliance.

Over this period, she had developed a

tradition of peace and neutrality.

It Is a feat which Is little

understood by most and has been described by historians as
”an astounding and all but unaccountable phenomenon.”-

Others,

1
-

In explaining this long period of Swedish neutrality, suggest

that the ”... reasons for this long period of peace are no

doubt to be found In the geographic position of the country,
In special circumstances such as the dependence of certain

belligerents on Swedish Iron ore and In pure luck.”
sure,

:

To be

the shrewdness of Swedish leaders and diplomats is

largely responsible for Sweden* s long tradition of neutrality
In the past century and a half which saw the world engulfed

In two catastrophic world wars and numerous other regional

wars of international consequences.

The amazing fact Is that,

despite the constant challenges provided by those conflicts
to Sweden’s neutrality,

she was able to walk the tight rope

between alliances in peace and belligerents in war, achieving
her position as a traditional non-aligned State without
suffering damage to the process of neutralization.
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Swedish foreign policy, during the nineteenth century,
was one of a small and weak State.

called a policy of deliberate

»'

It could hardly be

neutrality.

1

'

By this time,

Sweden had become reconciled to its new situation as a minor

European power.

She was also located on the periphery of

the Immediate zone of interest of the great powers.

These

circumstances permitted her to reorient her foreign policy
as changes in the balance of power warranted.

Yet, Sweden

demonstrated at different times definite positions of partiality which contradict the status of neutrality in its strictest sense.

This was especially apparent in her actions

against Russia during the Crimean War.

However, despite these

brief periods of partiality, Sweden managed to develop a

tradition of neutrality in war and non-alignment in peace.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the rise of

German power and its subsequent influence internationally had
created a balance of power in the Baltic region between

Germany and Russia.

This balance contributed to the security

of the small north European States, allowing them to remain

neutral during World War One.

Despite intense hostility to

Russia and strong tendencies toward alliance with Germany by
her governing and military classes, Sweden declared her

neutrality on August

4,

1914

espoused a neutral policy.

Henceforth, she consistently
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The Swedish Inter-war policy was conditioned by the

new International and strategic conditions In northern Europe.
Because both Germany and Russia were greatly weakened
war,

b\

the

the Swedes decided to disarm and reduce the strength

of Its defenses which had been kept at a high level during

the war.

Behind this decision were both an accurate appraisal

of the strategic situation and also an over-optimistic assump-

tion of a lasting state of peace.

Such optimism necessarily

came from Sweden’s participation in the international organ-

ization dedicated to peace.

Sweden was one of thirteen neutral

States of the First World War which became original members of
the League of

Nations.

Her entry into the League was a form of deviation from
the deliberate policy of neutrality that she had held to during

the twentieth century and had reinforced strongly throughout

World War One.*

However, the Swedish experience with the

League demonstrated that she was anxious to maintain her

traditional foreign policy in spite of her membership in the
League.

"The Swedish attitude had been revealed already by

its negative view of military sanctions when entering the

League.

It was also manifested in the Swedish support for

efforts to accept new members in the organization.

Sweden

*After World War One, Swedish politics were dominated by
the parties of the Left, the Social Democrats and the Liberals.
For these parties, it was a matter of course that Sweden
should <}oin the new peace organization.

cM d

not want to be Identified, because of its membership

In the League, with any particular set of powers.

..

.The

fundamental interest of Sweden was marked by its consistent
efforts to support principles of international law when
confllc-ts were referred to the new peace organization.”^
By the early 1930* s,

the League* s Inability to cope

with outbreaks of hostility was apparent.

The Italian

conquest of Ethiopia and the Spanish Civil War brought the

reality of failure to the members of the League.

In 1936,

Sweden, along with several other nations, renounced her

obligation to the Covenant.

Besides returning to her former

policy of neutrality, Sweden halted her disarmament program
and once again began her program of defense to protect her

neutrality.
At the outbreak of World War Two in September, 1939,

Sweden Immediately declared that she would remain neutral.

Throughout the war, she constantly protected and nourished
her neutrality in the face of possible German attack and
despl te accusations by both sides that she had violated that

neutrality.

In actuality, Sweden did violate her neutrality

on several occasions during the war.
•a

These violations were

result of either necessary political concessions (allowing

Germany to transport her troops across Sweden) or humanitarian efforts (aiding the Finns materially and diplomatically
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\n their desperate fight against the Russians In the "Winter

War" of 19^0).

She also helped train Norwegians and Danes as

part of the underground movement In those countries to rid

them of the Nazi Occupation.

By the end of the War, especi-

ally after her Involvement In the Russo-Flnnlsh War, Sweden
no longer had a strict neutral policy.

In reality, her posi-

tion was more that of a non-belligerent than that of a neutral.
Swedish Fost-war Neutralism .

Since the Second World War,

Sweden has been much worse off strategically than she was
after the First World War.

By 19^5.

her politico-military

situation had deteriorated considerably.

Whereas In 1919 a

balance of power had existed In the Baltic between Russia and
Germany, after 19^5. the entire area was under Soviet control.
The Russians had moved Into parts of southeastern Finland,
had absorbed the three Baltic States and held military control

over the Polish and German Baltic coasts.

The Soviet seml-

enclrclement of Sweden was completed with a base at Petsamo
and absorption of the Konlgsberg area.

More Important than this was the shift In the center of

gravity In the International balance of power.

The new

balance of power between the United States and the Soviet

Union clearly limited the scope of free action on the part
of a small State and rendered less favorable the prospects
of neutrality.

the whole,

This did not, however, cause the Swedes, on

to abandon their traditional policy of neutrality.

5
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There still were compelling reasons for keeping it.

One

author argued.
For Sweden, very definite reasons could
be cited for a continuation of the policy
of neutrality.
Sweden could best promote world peace by keeping outside ar
power blocs and great power alliances...
Such a policy would mean a continuation
of the policy of neutrality during World
War II and previously. Sweden had an
exposed position.
If It were to become a
member of a great power bloc It would form
a frontier area within this bloc and as
such might be exposed to the first blow in
a conflict.

Another author stated,
Abandonment of a policy of neutrality
would certainly transfer the area into a
theatre of war; perhaps even an important
one, whereas neutrality could possibly
^
permit the belligerents to Ignore Sweden. c
By 19*18, the Swedish government had definitely decided
to pursue a policy of non-alignment or neutralism.

It rejected

offers to join both the Brussels Pact and NATO,* desiring to

remain free and Independent of any power bloc entanglement.
In some quarters, it was emphasized that ”A characteristic

feature of our 'non-alignment

1

is that we,

in case of war, are

not committed to any specific course of action.... It is a vital

Interest to our country that other powers conceive our policy
as .. .directed towards keeping the country outside a great

power war.

Official government messages to the Parliament

*The American project to create NATO raised a serious
debate in Sweden. The Swedish army leaders argued that the
military basis of Sweden's traditional policy was now untenable, given the considerable power of the Soviet Union.
The government leaders replied that they must consider political as well as military aspects of the situation. They
pointed, out that Sweden's neutrality did much to allay Soviet

8

9

3b

(Riksdag) confirmed such a course:
The Swedish people, no less now than before,
feel themselves invited to go to a front
which means that we engage ourselves in the
cold war which is on. The fact that Sweden
has been able to preserve her peace for 135
years undoubtedly has a strong psychological
influence on the attitude of the Swedish
public.
During this long period Europe has
been shaken by tremendous wars without
Sweden being Involved. Whatever the explanation for our escape may be our people cannot
in any case lightly be convinced that our
security now should force us to cast away
neutrality as an abortive and antiquated

policy .
The risk that Sweden will be dragged into the
war in case of an East-West conflict is very
great but there is a probability, albeit a
small one, that we will be able to hold
ourselves outside of the war. As long as
there is the smallest possibility of avoiding
the nation’s destruction, advantage of it must
be taken .
The policies that emerged out of the early post-war

years have remained Intact although they have been modified

whenever necessary.

Sweden’s policy has remained grounded

upon two main points of view.
M

According to Osten Unden,

The first mainpoint is that Sweden ought not tie herself

to a.... Great Power alliance.

The second main point is that

suspicions, and that Soviet hostility would be too high a
price to pay for limited military assistance from RATO.
The government also argued that Soviet reactions to Swedish
membership in NATO most certainly would Include a threat to
the sovereignty and independence of Finland.
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we wish to take part In and to further all fruitful inter-

national cooperation outside the sphere of the military.” 10
She has a policy of neutralism in the simplest sense, that of

non-alignment in the cold war.

It is an active policy for

peaceful purposes, working internationally through the United
Nations, and is also a liberal and pragmatic policy of neu-

tralism created as an instrument to promote the interest of
the country.

Its main aim of non-alignment in peace is directed

toward preserving neutrality in war.

Yet,

Swedish neutralism

rejects the idea that non-alignment must be combined with

ideological neutrality.

Because of her history as a demo-

cracy and her liberal traditions, she is tied to the West, and
to talk about absolute Swedish neutrality is a bluff which

fools neither side in the cold war.

Her historical enemy is

Russia, and the Swedes have reacted aggressively to the Soviet
Union*

s

activities in eastern Europe.

Yet, they also object

to the United States’ presence in Vietnam,

in the attempt to

counter communist accusations of "false neutrality.”
^\bove all,

Sweden follows a realistic foreign policy

principle of national self-interest.

She has not allowed the

implementation of an international organization of collective
security embodied in the United Nations to create false hopes
of a lasting peace, as did the League of Nations.

Sweden practices a policy of armed neutrality.

Indeed,

Directly after
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the decision was made in 19*49 to reject NATO membership,

Sweden embarked upon an armaments program which was Intended
to achieve a position of strength, one which would deter

aggression.

The government itself, in a message to the

Riksdag on February

9,

19*49,

admitted that the policy of

non-alllance confronts Swedish defense with great demands.
It has to seek an appropriate balance between the needs of

diplomacy and defense.

"In our opinion the policy must aim

at pacifying our territory in such a sense that this terri-

tory is not disposed of by another power for military prepare t ions .
By 195*4, her defenses were impressive.

fourth largest air force in the world.

She had the

She manufactured

her own armaments, making her completely independent from
others for her weapons.

Her munition factories were among

the most modern in the world, turning out highly respected

war materials.

Also, by

195*4,

Sweden could mobilize six

hundred thousand men for her army within the period of a

few days.

,

shelters.

More recently, she has built underground air raid

"Operation Granite," a program of blasting out

atomic bomb shelters in solid rock, has provided Sweden

with as complete a civil defense system as is to be found
anywhere.

This project also built hardened missile sites

for Sweden 1

s

missile forces.

Except for fuel, Sweden

1

s

37

defense establishment Is completely Independent of any other
nation, a circumstance which Is very compatible with an

Independent foreign policy.

She Is prepared to defend her

neutrality by causing those who would violate her status to
pay a high price for their aggression.

Sweden’s non-alignment policies In the cold war do not

deter her from actively participating In causes concerned
with promoting International peace and cooperation.

Since

her entry In 19^9 Into the United Nations, Sweden has been
a source of leadership and resources for that organization.

Through the United Nations, Sweden has been able to participate actively In International politics and still remain

unattached to any power bloc In the cold war.

In this way,

she can pursue her policy of active neutralism while search-

ing for ways to overcome the tensions of the bl -polarization
of power.

Sweden has served the cause of peace through the United

Nations several times in the past twenty years.

She sent

medical staffs and supplies into the Korean conflict and peace
keeping forces into the Middle East during the 1956 Sinai
crisis.

-Again,

during the Belgian Congo Crisis of I960,

Swedish forces were in the United Nations’ contingent.

By

1964, over 10,000 Swedes had participated In United Nations*

peace forces, Including tours of duty in Israel, Lebanon,
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Congo, Kashmir and Cyprus. 12

Two prominent Swedes have lost

their lives serving the cause of the United Nations.

Count

Folk Eernadotte and Dag Hammarsk jold both died while offi-

cially representing the United Nations In different parts
of the world.

While it was true that the actual joining of the United

Nations represented a second departure from the strict policy
of neutrality pursued by Sweden beforehand,* her consistent

practice of non-involvement in great power disputes within
the organization has allowed her to retain her impartiality
to some degree.

It is Sweden* s policy not to participate in

any United Nations* action which does not have the full agree-

ment of all Security Council members.

In this way,

she does

not become caught between the rival blocs existing in that

organ of the United Nations.

It is a policy which expresses

solidarity with the international community in its search for
peace and, at the same time, allows Sweden to follow her

traditional policies of non-alignment and neutrality.
Each Swedish foreign policy decision which has been
made over the past twenty-five years has not been without

opposition in Sweden.

.Although she has maintained a tradition

of neutrality, there are forces within the country who feel

*55veden*s League of Nations membership was the first

departure from strict legal neutrality.
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that the rapid change In International politics after the

Second World War dictates that Sweden become aligned to a

power bloc In order to preserve herself In the event of
war.

These sentiments have been strongly supported In the

Riksdag, especially during the NATO debate.

However, It

Is clear that since the war the policy of non-alllance

has had the support of an overwhelming majority of not only
the parliament but also of the general public.

This majority

has embraced many different shades of opinion which can be

classified Into three groups.
The attitude of the first group Is one of pure neutrality.
It has Its foundations In the pacifist position.

Its attitude

Is dictated as much by the hatred of war as by the feeling

that Sweden cannot Influence the policies of the great powers.
•’The

arguments of this group have gradually become not so much

a plea for that freedom of action which can be ascribed to the

expression

*

freedom from alliance’ but rather a defense of

neutrality as

a

goal in itself.”

J

/mong the supporters of

this policy are farmers and working classes who cling most

reverently to the tradition of neutrality.
The second group puts emphasis on non-alllance In order
to have freedom of action.

It characterizes neutrality at

any price as out of date and divorced from real!ty a

It has

been its aim to keep Sweden out of great power conflicts as

ko

was demonstrated during the debates over Sweden* s

United

Nations* membership and sanctions against China In Korea.
"The position of this second group can be explained for
the most part by a general anti -communist sentiment and

anxiety over Sweden’s greater vulnerability and defenselessness In this age of air warfare and atom bombs."-

5-

1*

This group gains support from conservatives and liberals

and also from some military circles.
Finally, a third group has emerged recently.

This

group, often called "the third force," recommends a purely

neutralist policy.

Its position is based partly on criti-

cism of the United States

— which

has often been Identified

with anti-socialism— and partly as an attempt to distinguish
positive achievements of Communism.

It claims that Sweden

ought to strive for a genuinely neutral policy

that seeks

to reconcile the two opposing blocs.

In general, Swedes support the policy of neutralism

which has been adopted by their government.

They also have

come to support the idea "that the uncommitted, in many

respects privileged position of Sweden also Imposes definite

obligations of serving the cause of International peace.
Consequently, they have demonstrated a remarkable x^illingness
to help insure the neutrality of their country by supporting

the nation’s defense programs and, at the same time, to serve
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the international community through the United Nations.

Summary.

The Swedish approach to neutrality in the cold

war has been a pragmatic and liberal one.

It Is pragmatic

in the sense that Swedish neutrality serves the best Interests
of that small European State.

It adopts policies which expand

her trade, it pursues programs of International cooperation

which result in favorable relations throughout the world and
it serves the interests of the Nordic region by stabilizing,

through Its non-alllance posture, a potentially explosive
area.

The Swedish approach to neutrality is liberal in its

application.

Sweden does not permit the strict and rigid in-

ternational laws of neutrality to serve her as guidelines for
policy.

She follows those policies which are suitable to the

specific conditions of the cold war.

And yet, she finds

herself limited by her policy of non-alllance as is evident
when she considers joining organizations of western Europe

which require political or military integration.

She can seek

membership only in those organizations such as the European
Free Trade Association and the Organization for Economic and

Cultural Development whose concerns are purely economic.

Sweden also finds herself stifled in many cases by her neighbor,
Finland.

Fear of a Soviet invasion of Finland has caused the

Swedes to move cautiously In their relations with the West in

order not to provoke Russian ambitions in Finland.
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The essence of Swedish neutrality rests In the prospects
of remaining out of war.

It Is the central concern of all

Swedish officials and citizens.

As Tage Erlander states,

"We hope that our neutrality In peacetime will make It possible

for us to be neutral In war.

A big nation always knows It

will still be alive after a war.

For the small nation like

ourselves, war is the catastrophe that may mean the end. ”16
He also observes that,

M

For the time being, the Swedish

citizen consoles himself with the thin hope that the next war
might be a short one.

If only Sweden could sit out the first

ten days, there might be no more need of joining an alliance.
If Sweden is to realize its goals concerning neutrality,

It

must constantly demonstrate to the international community
that Its neutrality Is real, and that It is pursuing a policy

which is credible and practical in the world today.

Torsten

Nilsson concludes that,

An essential condition determining whether
a policy of neutrality can be maintained
when put to the test Is of course that the

rest of the world must have confidence in
the will of the neutral state to uphold
unfalteringly Its line of foreign policy
The neutral country must each day
chosen.
exert Itself to build up and cherish this
confidence. Firmness and consistency must
be shown by the representatives of the
policy of neutrality. We must make It clear
by woids and deeds that It is our intention
in the event of war to use the freedom of
action we have preserved in peace-time to
assert our neutrality. We must not give the
Great Powers any grounds for suspecting

1

'-1

?

that Swedish territory may be placed at the
disposal of another Fower and form a base
from which an attack could be launched.
Our foreign policy must not be drawn up so
as to give rise to suspicions In the country
of one Great Power or expectations In the
It must be possible to
country of another.
rely on the policy we have chosen. Thus In
this respect our foreign policy aims at
gaining and retaining the confidence of the
Great Powers. 13

CHAPTER V

FINLAND AND NEUTRALITY

History .

The experience of Finland with a foreign policy

of neutrality has been more difficult and more Inconsistent

than that of Sweden.

The reasons for this are twofold.

First, Finland did not win her Independence from foreign

domination until rather recently.

Finland has enjoyed inde-

pendence and sovereignty only since the downfall of the

Russian Tsarist regime in 1917*
’’The

As one author aptly puts it,

revolution gave the Finns their chance to break loose

from Russia and end their status as a duchy which had lost
Its autonomy during a period of severe repression."^

Conse-

quently, Finland has controlled her own foreign policy for
only fifty years.

In such a short span, she has not been

able to build upon a tradition of neutrality.

Because of this,

the credibility of her neutrality has been constantly under

suspicion from other States simply because it has not been

demonstrated to them over

a long period of time that the

Finns are dedicated to the principles of neutrality.

And

until their dedication was proven by their actions, the
Finns were looked upon as opportunists In International

politics whose claims of neutrality could not be taken quite
as seriously as those of Sweden or Switzerland.

This remains

true even though, as Half Torngren says, "... throughout 150

^5

years of nationhood one central Idea has dominated Finnish

thinking In foreign affairs

— neutrality

.

’’

2

Secondly, Finland’s close proximity to the Soviet Union

with which she shares seven hundred miles of border has
forced her to follow policies compatible with the Soviet

Union’s security Interests In Scandinavia, but which, do not
jeopardize Finland’s independence.

At different times,

Finland has been forced to modify her neutral status either
because she needed outside aid against a Soviet Union threatening to end Finnish Independence, or because she had to

acquiesce to Soviet security interests through bl-partlsan
treaty agreements.

As a result of these two circumstances,

Finnish neutrality has been coloured by inconsistencies and

deviations from the norm.
has never waned.

Yet, her dedication to neutrality

It has only suffered, when conditions

warranted digression.
The inter-war period brought a stern test for the newly

independent Finland.
hands-,

Even though power in Russia had changed

and the new Soviet government had agreed to the Treaty

of Tartu in 1920 (which recognized Finnish sovereignty over
the Petsamo region in the north), the memories of Tsarist

repression could not be erased.
eyes,

Russia remained, in Finnish

the natural enemy of the country’s freedom.

’’The

Bolsheviks were suspected of relying on subversion to bring

be

back to the Soviet Union what had been lost by Russia. "3
To the Finns, the only bulwark against this new threat of

Communism seemed to be the Kaiser’s Germany whose armies,
at the end of 1917 and early 1918, were masters of eastern

Europe.

The Finns made the decision in January, 1918, to

anchor Finland’s foreign policy to German support by
electing a German prince as King of Finland and by inviting

German troops onto Finnish soil.
This policy collapsed with the fall of Germany in
November, 1918.

Ey this time, Finland had become compro-

mised in the eyes of the Western Powers.

A complete turna-

bout in Finnish foreign policy was necessary.
all ties with the Germans were broken.

Consequently,

This action brought

recognition of Finland’s sovereignty by the United States,
Britain and France in Nay, 1919-

Russia

Subsequent settlements with

of border claims through the Treaty of Tartu estab-

lished acceptable relations with that neighbor.
With the recognition of the Great Fowers and membership
in the League of Nations,* the establishment of the Identity

of Finland as an independent State was complete.

Having cut

off her early bonds with Germany, Finland was then free of

foreign political commitments.

This had obvious advantages;

it also bred a feeling of insecurity.

Yet, an attempt to draw

*The Finnish "government, like other newly independent
States, believed that membership in the League would give
an additional guarantee to its independent status. This
belief greatly influenced Finland’s decision to join.

.
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Finland Into a Nordic security arrangement failed to pass
In Parliament.

”A

substantial majority was reluctant to

let the country be Involved with nations with whom Finland

had little In common.

This reaction contained the seed of

a policy of neutrality

However, there were currents within Finland which were
far from neutral. Nationalists clamoured for liberation of
all Finnish-speaking people Inside Russia.

Moreover, anta-

gonism between the Finnish-speaking majority and the Swedishspeaking minority in Finland disturbed relations with Sweden
and other parts of Scandinavia.
in the 1920*

s

Max Jakobson wrote, "Finland

was undecided, as it were, whether she belonged

to Scandinavia or the Baltic States.

this period is hard to define.

Her foreign policy in

Indeed,

there was no foreign

policy to define: the League of Nations was supposed to look

after the security of Its members."^
'

The 1930’s brought increasing problems to the Inter-

national community.

The rise of totalitarian power In Ger-

many and Italy brought Increasing disillusionment with the
League of Nation’s ability to cope with such a menace.

Left

unprotected by the Imminent collapse of the collective security system, Finland began a search for security.

What the

Finnish leaders desired was a policy of peace

friendship

and.

toward all and no involvement In any of the conflicts of the

B^g Powers*

Their first step toward such a policy was taken

In 1932 when they signed a non-agression treaty with the
Soviet

bn Ion.
a

Then,

in December,

1935»

the Finnish Parliament approved

government resolution declaring Finland* s adherence to

Scandinavian neutrality.

The resolution rang with the words:

’’Friendship toward all and entangling alliance with none.”^

By this time,

the official policy of the Finnish government

was to preserve Finnish Independence by developing a Scandinavian

neutrality bloc. 7

The neutrality of Finland could be best

preserved In association with the other Scandinavian States of
Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Iceland whose loyalty to the concept
of neutrality was universally acknowledged.
A

change In governmental leaders In 1937 opened a new

era In Finnish foreign policy.

The government was headed by

President Kyostl Kalllo, a member of the middle-of-the-road
-Agrarian Party.

The new coalition also Included for the first

time the Sooial Democrats as partners with the Agrarians and
the Liberals, This brought Finland In line Ideologically with

the rest of Scandinavia.

It also greatly pleased the Russians,

because the new government Immediately set out to demonstrate
that there was no Finnish-German cooperation on security

arrangements.

However, as tension In Europe Increased, the

Russians, fearful that the Germans would overrun Finland and,
thus, use her as a stepping stone for an attack on Leningrad,

began pressuring the Finns to accept Soviet protection and
acquiesce to Soviet military operations on Finnish soil.

s

But Finland did not wish to substitute Soviet for German

protection.

She hoped, along with the other Scandinavian

nations, that the belligerents In a war would bypass the

Baltic region.
On the eve of war, Finland continued to demonstrate

her neutrality.

After relinquishing her obligations to

the League Covenant,

she and the other Nordic nations set

up rules for a common neutrality.

Finland also refused to

sign the German non-aggression pact In 1939, and, even though
she had agreed to some small compromises with the Russians,
she continued to emphasize her neutrality to her neighbor.*

With the German attack on Poland in 1939, the Scandinavian
countries declared their neutrality.

But the negotiations

among these northern nations to build some military under-

pinnings to the declaration of neutrality were going badly.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union continued to pressure the Finns
for agreements which would insure Finnish and Soviet security
In case of German attack.

Yet, to yield to these demands

would be inconsistent with Finland
refused.

1

s

neutrality, and so she

Her refusal caused the Russians to force their

demands on the Finns for the sake of Soviet security.** The

*The Soviet Union, In the meantime, moved to guarantee
On August 23,
her security Interests in the Baltic Region.
pact between
non-aggression
a
signed
Stalin
and
Hitler
1939,
their countries. This pact placed Finland within the Soviet*
sphere of influence.
**The Soviets wanted to push the Finnish-Soviet border
north in order to place Leningrad out of the range of modern
artillery from the Finnish side.
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Russians attacked Finland on November 30, 1939, to start
the ’’Winter War.”

Even though the Finns fought bravely and extremely
well,

the war could only end In their defeat.

’’The

real

problem for the Finns was to find the safest time and conditions for capitulation while mobilizing outside help.
The peace of Moscow (19^0), which ended this war, was only
a signpost marking the beginning of a new period of pressure

from the Russians and Increasing counter-pressure from the
o

Germans.”

The climax came when Finland was drawn Into

renewed war against the Soviets In June, 19^2; this time on
the German side.

Once again compromised In the eyes of the

Western Allies because she fought on the German side, Finland
was to be left at the mercy of the Soviet Union when peace
was finally

reached In 19^*

For the Finns, this was unfortunate not only because
of the harsh peace terms Imposed on them by Russia but also

because throughout the course of the war, Finland had con-

tinually emphasized that her conflict with the Soviet Union
was separate from the bigger conflict raging in Europe.

During the Winter War, she had solicited aid and arms only
from neutral Sweden in the attempt to retain some semblance
of her neutrality in the Big Power struggle.

when the second war with Russia broke out

I

Unfortunately,

n 19^1

>

^

Innlsh
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objectives had shifted from neutrality to one of regaining
what It could from the losses of the Winter War.

Thus, she

could only expect to be chastized by the Allies at the end
as a co-belllgerent with Germany in the war against the

Russians.

Her desire for revenge left her open to the "Dra-

conian peace" administered by the Soviet Union upon the

cessation of hostilities.

Finland and Cold War Neutralism .

The development of

Finnish neutralism can be categorized Into three stages:
the early post-war years from 194*1-1948, culminating In the

signing of the Finnish-Soviet Mutual Assistance Treaty in
1948;

the period from 1948-1955, generally recognized as

the rebirth of Finnish Independence and neutrality; and,

finally, 1955 through the present, a period of expansion

and maturing for Finland*

s

foreign policy of neutralism.

The fall of 1944 brought to the Finns the realities of

wartime cooperation with the Nazi Germans.

Defeated in

the two-phase war of 1939-44, caused by two Soviet attacks,
the Finns were left by the acquiescing Western Allies to

accept, unaided, Russian armistice

and peace terms whereby

Finland was to be crushed without military conquests

The

terms called for territorial concessions,* destruction of

German military capability in Finland and a huge reparations
bill of |600 millions.

It was the large reparations payment

*71nnlsh forces were to withdraw behind the 19^0 borders,
and Petsamo was to be ceded to Russia.
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that was most harsh in Finnish eyes, because it seemed to

mean annihilating economic servitude which would eventually
lead to default and occupation by Russian troops.

However, Finland did actually manage to avoid Russian

occupation after the war, partly because Finnish military
forces were still in fighting condition.

The Russians by

then knew of the Finns’ determination to remain Independent

and did not want to face that resilience on the battlefield
again.
come,.

Yet,

the threat was to remain for many years to

Consequently, the most important problem facing

post-war Finland was not the reparation, reconstruction and
resettlement left by the War.
ta.

The single most important

k was the development of a credible foreign policy which

would find acceptance with the Russians and would maintain

Finnish Independence and security.
’’The

Half Torngren wrote,

failure of neutrality in 1939 bad been due primarily

to the profound mutual distrust that had then prevailed

between Finland and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government

at that time had had no faith in Finnish neutrall ty .

. .

.The

foremost task of Finland’s post-war policy, therefore, was
to gain and secure Soviet confidence in Finland as a peaceful
neighbor."'*'

0

The initiation of a foreign policy with special regard
to Russian Interests came as a result of the election of

Juho Faaslklvl, a Conservative, as president of Finland in

H
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point on, Finland's foreign policy has been

under the considerable influence of this man.

It is he and

his disciples who have forged the specific interests of

Finland into a policy of neutrality and non-alllance through
the past twenty-five years.
the

There are many who claim that

’’Paasikivi Line,” as this policy has come to be titled,

has enabled Finland to remain free and independent.

It is

surely responsible for keeping the Russian bear at bay,

satisfying that nation's security interests in the North.

Paaslklvi's policy was aimed at reassuring the Soviet

Union that her vital security interests were acknowledged
by the Finns.

The "Paasikivi Line” is based on the assump-

tion that the Soviet Union's interest in Finland is pre-

eminently a security Interest, and that occupation and

satellization are not necessary to Insure achievement of this
objective.

He,

therefore, followed a conciliatory line

toward the Russians.

Even before he became president,

he had held the view that Finland's security and preservation

of independence rested on maintaining good and credible

relations with the Soviet Union.

In a speech on October 15,

1944, he addressed himself to this Issue:

Dominating everything in Finland's foreign
policy is our country's relationship with
our big eastern neighbor, the Soviet Union.
That is our real problem in foreign policy....
Finland's foreign policy must be directed in
such a way in the future so as not to go against
the Soviet Union.

5^

Paaslkl vi also asserted that If the readiness and willingness
to fight were me de known to the world, Russia would respect

Finland*

s

Independence.

These Ideas represented the be-

ginnings of a policy of neutralism.
be until 19 55 that Finland

such policies.

However, It would not

would be able to practice openly

It had to first convince the Soviets that the

Finnish adherence to such principles was credible.
In summary of these early Paaslkl vl years,

It appears

correct to say that Finnish foreign affairs were wholly

dominated by a determination to avoid all things that might
offend the Soviet Union.

The pre-1939 ‘Scandinavian orient-

ation, so important In Finnish contacts with the outside

world, was muted.

The earlier policy of strict neutrality

and no alliances with or commitments to the Powers still
remained, but the anxiety to please Russia caused what many
came to see as a new pro-Russian orientation.
The beginning of the second stage in the post-war

development of Finnish foreign policy parallels the Initial
signs of thaw in Finnish-Soviet relations.

By 19^7.

the

conciliatory policies of President Paasikivl toward the

Russians were showing definite results.

The Soviet leaders

demonstrated their pleasure with Finnish policies by easing

war-reparation payments, giving numerous trade concessions
and showing a rare tolerance for Finnish acceptance of loans

s
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from Sweden and the United States.

Finland, on the other

hand, continued to demonstrate her recognition of Soviet

interests and, at the same time, collect credit towards

policy of neutrality.

a

She refused to participate in the

Paris Marshall Plan Conference in 19^8 because:
...The Marshall Plan having become the
source of serious differences of opinion
among the Big Powers, Finland, desiring
to remain outside the areas of conflict
in Big Power politics regrets that it does
not find it possible to participate in said
conference.
The start of the cold war brought more concessions by

the Russians to Finnish desires for neutrality.

They chose

to treat Finland as an example of Soviet good neighborliness
in the attempt to offset her ruthless actions to her neigh-

bors in Eastern Europe.
In April, 19^8, Finland
of Mutual Assistance.

and

the'

Soviets

signed the Treaty

The preamole to this Treaty was important

to the Finns because in it the Soviets acknowledged Finland*
’’desire to stay outside the conflicts of Interest between the

great powers.

This was the first instance of Soviet acknow-

ledgement to Finnish neutrality contained in public record since
the war.

However, there were many people who accused the Finns of

compromising their new neutrality by signing the Mutual Assistance Treaty.

They said that it tended to color Finnish neutrality,
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because it gave the Soviet Union rights of transit and lease
of a military base In Finland.

Treaty.

Others rose In defense of the

Half Torngren Is one of those who contends that

neutrality and the Treaty are compatible:
Purists may object that the commitments
undertaken by Finland In the Treaty are
Incompatible with a neutral status. It
must be remembered, however, that those
comml tments apply solely to the defense
of Finland* s own territory.
In this, the
Treaty Is unique among the numerous
security arrangements made by the big
Powers and It Is worth noting that an
authoritative Soviet commentary has
called It an agreement for the guarantee
of neutrality to distinguish It from the
mutual assistance pacts the Soviet Union
has concluded with other countries.
From
the point of view of the theory of neutrality this may be an unorthodox Interpretation.
But the Treaty reflects the reality of the
Finnish situation. It is indispensable for
the creation of confidence without which the
neutrality of Finland would be built on sand.

.

:

The second phase In the development of Finland* s post-

war neutrality ended In 1955 with the renewal of the Mutual

Assistance Treaty.

During this time, Finland continued to

project herself as a legitimate neutral In the cold war while

reassuring the Soviets that they did not contemplate any move

which would threaten her security.

By 1955,

it was abundantly

clear that, while her position was far from secure, Finland
was not a hostage In the hands of the Soviets.

In the ten

years since the war, Finland had paid off her war debt to the
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Soviets and was now ready to take an active role In the

development of the world community.

With her admission

into the United Nations in 1956 and definite modifications
in the "Paaslkivi Line" due to the retirement of the old

statesman, Finland now sought to pursue an active policy
of neutralism.

The Soviet withdrawal from the military base

at

Porkkala. in 1955 opened the way to International recognition

of Finnish neutrality.

So long as the Finns could not have

full sovereignty over her territory, others

would not

recognize her claims for neutrality in case of war.

Now,

after ten years, that recognition was forthcoming.
It is felt by the Finns that as long as they follow

the broad outlines of the "Paaslkivi Line," the Soviet Union

does not feel threatened and will respect Finnish Independence.
The post-Paasikivi government of Urho Kekkonen of the Agrarian

Party, a strong supporter of the "Paaslkivi Line," has continued to respect this fact.

But it has also endeavored to

modify and broaden that policy.

While Paaslkivi, through

force of circumstance, had concentrated on improving relations

with the Soviet Union, Kekkonen has ventured into the Western
world and beyond.

"It is in the area of Flnnlsh-Scandinavian

relations that one can say that President Kekkonen has stepped

beyond the *Paaslkivi Line.*

Finland*s foreign policy is now

—
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characterized by a ’line of active neutrality’ which Is In
contrast to the more passive Paaslklvl policy.

visits to the

Kekkonen’s

Western nations of Britain, France, the United

States and the leading countries of the

»

Third World

1

'

have

brought pronouncements of recognition of Finland’s neutrality
from those countries.

This has done much to dispel the idea

that Finland Is a satellite of the Soviet Union.

Soviet

Premier Khruschev aided the credibility of Finland’s neutrality with statements such as: "The policy of your state
a policy of neutrality and independence, a policy of the

struggle for peace

— favorably

influences the setting In the

northern part of Europe."^'
Through the above discussion of Finland’s experience at
neutrality, it can be argued that the Finnish concept of

neutrality is a result and part of a historical process
rather than the product of abstract thought.

It is designed

to meet the realities of power rather than the precepts of

international law; it is a response to the challenge of
external circumstances which link Finland to the West with
ties of history, ideology and economic advantage, yet place

her within the scope of vital Soviet security Interests and

within the Immediate reach of Soviet military power.
at the same time bold but restrained.

It is

It is bold in the

sense that it ardently protects Finnish independence,
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confessing to all its willingness and determination to

remain free.

Yet,

the Soviet Union

it is restrained by the proximity of

and limited by shying away from big-

power politics and refusing to take sides in the cold
war.

Max Jakobson wrote, "Finland has adopted a more rigor-

ous concept of neutrality by proclaiming her determination
to stay outside the conflicts and controversies between

the Big Powers, not only in time of war but also in peace.
The pattern of Finnish neutrality is demonstrated in her

attitude toward the German question.. She has chosen to
recognize neither German State in the attempt to show her
impartiality.

Yet,

she has managed good relations with both

sides, having trade Interests in the two parts of Germany.

Neither does she recognize sides in Korea or Vietnam.

".Any

attempt to fit this policy (Finland’s neutrality) Into the
framework of International law would be a desperate under0
."- - p
-i

taking.

But,

In practice,

it has served Finland well

1

The Finnish experience in the United Nations has been

much like that of Sweden.

Through this international organ-

ization, the Finns have been able to broaden the

Line."

"Paaslkivi

Within the confines of the United Nations, they have

worked for peace in the world and for the lessening of tension
in the cold war.

Membership in the United Nations has also
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benefited Finnish claims to neutrality, as her actions In that

organization lend credibility to her status.

Finland considers

her activities In the United Nations as her primary opportunity
to practice

active neutralism.”

”

As long as she maintains her

aloofness In Big Power conflicts, her status of neutrality
cnnot be questioned.

Finland has recently taken steps to bolster her neutrality
by developing her domestic defenses.

In 19 6l, President Kekkonen

announced that: ’’Finland Is moving toward a more sophisticated
defense policy designed to support her policy of neutrality In

moments of International crisis.

”''L

'

She bought from the Soviet

Union Mlg fighter planes with air-to-air missiles.
acceptable air defense.

But,

of

She has an

course, these measures will

not Insure her neutrality or security.

Her policy is aimed at

keeping out of war.
Summary

.

The Finnish practice of neutrality is strikingly

similar In many respects to that of her Nordic neighbor, Sweden.
However, the fact that she is an Instrumental part of the Soviet

security interests has made

a great deal of difference

and

has been an ever-present burden on Finnish foreign policy.

The

Finns have always tried to demonstrate a willingness to develop

cordial relations with the Russians.

convincing them of their sincerity.

They have had a hard time
It is a tremendously

frustrating position that the Finns are in, because, with every
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decision that they make, they must take Into account possible

Russian reactions.

Yet,

they have adapted to the cruel real-

ities of their circumstances and have managed to delicately

place themselves in the envious position of non-alllance and

neutrality.

Max Jakobson, In his book, Finnish Neutrality

,

explains the strategy and the rewards of the Finnish foreign
policy:

Finland has consistently pursued a policy
that has satisfied the Soviet craving for
security. Finland has also maintained
her Independence and pat'll amentry democracy in the sense that the Western Powers
understand these terms. Finland Is friendly
to the Soviet Union without being subservient; she is a Western democracy without
challenging Soviet security. As a consequence, Finland has hardly even been mentioned in the disputes and quarrels between
East and West: the cold war has passed her
by. 20

CHAPTER VI

SWITZERLAND AND NEUTRALITY
El

story .

The history of Switzerland and her foreign

policy of neutrality can easily lead to the Illusion that
there exists In the central part of Europe a genuine utopia,

populated only by peace-loving and righteous people who
over the past 150 years have done no wrong.

Such an Il-

lusion can be readily accounted for If one considers the

numerous conflicts and

f Ight-to-the-death

wars which have

occurred all around, this European mountain haven over the
last 150 years.

verified.

To be sure, much of the Illusion can be

Switzerland has not been a battleground for any

conflict In a century and a half.*

She has managed, to

maneuver away from entangling alliances that could only have
spelled her doom.

Her people have come to look upon them-

selves as peace-loving as Is consistent with their long

tradition of neutrality in peace and war.

Yet, when one

delves Into the particulars of Swiss foreign policy, It
is readily determined that her neutrality and long tradition

of peace are not based simply upon a love and yearning for
It is less fashionable but more accurate to explain

peace.

until the end of the Napoleonic wars, Switzerland
” l
in the conflicts of Europe,
Involved
was
_
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Switzerland’s successful experience at neutrality by
exploring such factors as her geographical position, her

geological advantages, the willingness of the big
powers to recognize her policy as credible, her

domestic

anatomy and finally her readiness to defend her status
with arms.
The notion of Swiss neutrality is older than the notion
of a Swiss nation.

It has deep roots in the history of the

individual cantons as well as the Swiss confederation.

The

term "neutrality” was first used in an official document in
1536.

But the origins of the official policy are usually

traced to a declaration of the Federal Diet in 167^ to the
effect that Switzerland Intended to adopt a "neutral position"
in the war between France and the Netherlands.1

tion was

This declara-

an attempt by Swiss statesmen to protect their

country from entanglements In the recurring wars that were

characteristic of the European balance-of -power system.

How-

ever, neutrality at this time was as much a necessary condition
of internal stability as of external security.

For a country

which contains three official languages and two religions and
whose unity is achieved only by due respect for all these

different elements, neutrality in foreign affairs was and is
a necessity.

The Swiss experience with the diverse elements

of religion in the seventeenth century demonstrated this fact.

^

As Peter Lyon stated, "The Swiss could only retain their

Identity and their freedom In diversity by a policy which

accommodated theological differences within the Confederation but forbade an active bias towards ones co-rellglonlsts abroad.”

These early beginnings of Swiss neutrality were further

enhanced by several other factors.

Geographically, Switzer-

land Is situated In Central Europe, a position which would

tend to make her a pawn in the power politics and struggles
of that continent.

Fortunately for the Swiss, her powerful

enemies of France, Austria, Spain and the Netherlands nullified
each other*

s

designs on Switzerland by maintaining a precarious

balance of power in that region.
conspicuous.

Other elements are more

The mountainous topography of Sx^ritzerland makes

it difficult to successfully Invade this country by foot

without sustaining heavy and, in most cases, unacceptable
losses.

Switzerland is essentially a mountain fortress with

almost Impregnable natural defenses which have stood the Swiss
in good stead these many years.

The absence of any natural

resources to capture and the military preparedness of the
Swiss army also helped to guarantee her policy of neutrality
from its very beginning.

Yet,

despite these advantages, Swiss

neutrality was stymied by her involvement in the Napoleonic
wars of 1798-1815.

As a result, the contemporary period of

T
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Swiss neutrality dates from the Congress of Vienna of Nov-

ember 20, 1815, which established the permanent neutrality
of Switzerland as guaranteed by the Great Fowers,

Cyril

Black writes:
In 1815 the Congress of Vienna agreed on
the neutralization of Switzerland as part
of a general settlement after the bloody
upheavals that had been touched off by the
French Revolution and Napoleon* s drive for
a continental empire.
The powers assembled
at Vienna were concerned with stabilizing
the European system, which to their way of
thinking at the time was the core of the
international system. The neutralization
of Switzerland though only a small part of
the total settlement, was a conscious act
It was meant to
of preventive diplomacy.
thwart any upset of the new balance of power,
particularly an upset engineered by any power
or coalition of powers conquering or bringing into a military alliance this sma_ul country
which had common boundaries with France,
Austria and several German and Italian states
and which controlled vital lines of communication. J

Through the declaration at Vienna, the status of Swiss

neutrality was established as it largely remains today.
The importance of the Congress of Vienna rests in the fact

that for the first time the permanent neutrality of a small

State became part of the law of nations.

More important

to the Swiss was that from the Great Power acknowledgement

of their neutrality came the implication that Switzerland

had ceased to be a keypolnt in the European order.

This

implication arises directly from the 1815 Congress of Vienna.
h

he signatory Powers recognized the neutrality of Swl tzer-

land and proclaimed that her inviolability and her independence
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from any Influence are In the Interest of Europe.

While the 1815 Agreement obligated the Great Powers
to guarantee the neutral status of Switzerland, the Swiss

also were made accountable to such actions Intended to

demonstrate her commitment to that status.

She was obli-

gated, as Is any sovereign State which has been neutralized
by International agreement, to refrain from using its

military forces for

any purpose other than self-defense

or the maintenance of International order, to stay clear of

any military or political alliance, and to refrain from

allowing other States to use

tier

territory for military

purposes.

Even though the Agreement was unique in the sense that
it sought to insulate Switzerland against certain forms of

International rivalry and was to be a technique for conflict avoidance, it was not a drastic changeover for the
Swiss.

The principle of neutrality embodied in the 1815

Agreement had firm roots In Swiss policy.

It was more the

formalization of existing Swiss policy than the creation
of a new policy.

Indeed, although from a legal standpoint

the neutral status of Switzerland is based on the treaty of
1815,

from a practical point of view, it is an example of

self-neutralization rather than neutralization by international

C7

guarantee. In fact, the Irony of this Is that as time passed,
the so-called guarantors of Swiss neutrality noted In the

1815 treaty became the principal threat;, to her neutral
statue.

Switzerland could less and loss depend upon the

Great Powers for security.

She finally came to rely upon

her own forcer: of defense as her guarantor.

Since 1015, the Swiss have sought to maintain a con-

sistent policy of neutrality.
task.

It has not been an easy

With the continent of Europe continually embroiled

In one conflict after the next, Switzerland has often found

herself pushed to the brink of war.
true In 191^

and.

This was especially

19^0 as the German High Command In both

wars seriously considered Invading Switzerland.

Yet,

the

Swiss managed to escape, their neutrality unsol led and,
In fact,

enhanced because of their, unwillingness to com-

promise their status In spite of considerable danger.
Swiss neutrality was also reinforced over time because of
her role as a center of International finance and commerce

and as headquarters for a wide variety of International

organizations.

Up until the end of the Second World War,

Switzerland had made only one concession or deviation In
her neutrality.

That was her membership In the League of

Nations after World War One.

Even this move can hardly be
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considered a deviation.

Switzerland joined the League under

special circumstances intended to maintain her neutrality,
yet which allowed, her to participate In that organization.

Fost-wai Fold K n Foil

c. v

.

Switzerland, like Sweden, Is

a neutralist State in the sense that she Is not a member of

any cold war alliance.

Only In this limited yet Important

respect can she be considered neutralist, for the vast

majority of her citizens consider themselves a part of the

Western world.

In the years of the cold war, the Swiss still

cling to their cherished national traditions of non-involvement
in military alliances in peacetime and of neutrality in war.

In order to demonstrate the consistency of her neutral stance,
we can examine the official interpretation of neutrality

adopted by the Political Department of the Swiss government on

November 12, 195^

•

In It, we can see the guidelines of the

past and present policy of Swiss neutrality.
This document begins by noting the essential difference

between customary

and permanent neutrality.

The former in-

volves only non-participation In war between States, while
the latter requires neutrality In time of peace as well as in

time of war.

(The Swiss consider themselves under the commit-

ments of permanent neutrality as guaranteed by the Great Fowers
In 1815.)

The document then goes on to explain the principal

bbllgatlons of a permanently neutral State In time of peace.
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They are: "...to abstain from starting a war, to defend its
neutrali ty, and to avoid policies and actions that might on
some future occasion Involve It In hostilities."-

More specifically, the Swiss interpretation states that
a.

permanently neutral State must not adhere to any treaty.

Including defensive treaties and collective security arrangements.

Nor must it

conclude any military agreements.

The

restriction on ties to other States Is limited to political
and military t^es and does not, In the Swiss view, extend to

treaties for nonpoll

tl

cal or humanitarian purposes.

Partici-

pation of the permanent neutral In International conferences
and organizations with universal membership Is questionable
In the Swiss Interpretation because of the rival political

groups which may exist In such organizations. This point of
view explains, in part, th« Swiss refusal to join the United
I

Nations, although this question Is still open for debate within

Switzerland.*

While they hold this view, the Swiss carefully

confirm their right to offer their good offices or mediation
even during hostilities without hindering their Impartiality.
Economically, a permanent neutral must not enter Into a

customs or economic union which limits her political activity.
To do so might mean the political Involvement of the permanent

neutral with other States.

Finally, the document concludes

that the obligations of neutrality should be narrowly inter-

preted, and that "...when Switzerland undertakes policies that

-*See pages 7^ end 75 for reasons why Switzerland joined
the League of Nations,

s
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go beyond those called for by customary or permanent neu-

trality, they should be regarded not as the fulfillment of

obligations but as measures designed to strengthen the
confidence of belligerents In the Institution of neutrality.”^'

With a close examination of the specific actions of
the Swiss government since 19^5, It becomes apparent that
Swl tzerland*

s

pretation.

It

neutrality Is consistent with the above Inter1

;

especially true upon examination of her

adherence to the three obligations of a permanent neutral In
peacetime.

She has started no wars nor was Involved in any

during this perlcd.

The backbone of her neutrality Is her

adherence to armed neutrality, and she has taken steps to
update her defenses.

Finally, her refusal to Join the

United

Nations Is In the strictest sense her pursuit of non-involve-

ment In the power politics of the International community.
Switzerland*

s

P

.

rrned

Neutrality

.

Even though the Swiss

have avoided actual military conflict for a considerable time,
they have not been lulled Into thinking that It is simply

because they are

8

peace-loving people.

From the early days

of their neutrality In the European wars of the eighteenth

century, they have constantly been prepared to defend their

country should the need arise.

Even after the Great Power

guarantee of Swiss security was given at the Congress of
Vienna In 1815, the Swiss maintained their highly respected
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military preparedness In case that guarantee failed to
materialize.

It has already been noted that because of

her efficient army and mountain fortifications, Switzerland

escaped German invasion in 1914 and 1940.
years,

Through these

the task of maintaining an efficient, modern, up-

to-date military defense capability has constantly occupied
the Swiss government.

As a result, Switzerland has never

been a burden on her neighbors for defense.

remained self-reliant for her security.

She has always

By arming her moun-

tain redoubt to the teeth, she has been able to ward off all

aggressors by simply raising the cost of her capture to a
point where it has, until now, been completely unacceptable
to an invader.

It Is a policy which has the full support of

the Swiss people.

It is a policy which has instilled pride

,

In them, because the guarantee of the guarantor States has

lost much of its meaning.

Moreover, It is a policy which has

worked.
However, the advent and use of air power during World

War Two produced a serious challenge to Switzerland
Impregnable mountain fortress.

1

s

formerly

With air power, It is no

longer necessary to go through the teeth of the Swiss defense.
It

is now possible to fly over it and drop bombs into the

Swiss valleys.*

Moreover, with the arrival of the nuclear

*It is the same situation which the British found themselves in. The realities of German air power over London
during World War Two made the British realize that suddenly
the English Channel, In a sense, had dried up.

s
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bomb,

the whole question of Swiss security and Independence

can be settled with a few well-placed bombs.

,

It Is a

circumstance vrhlch has threatened to shatter Switzerland*

armed neutrality ever
Nevertheless,

since World War Two.

the Swiss have attempted to cope with

these new realities of the Nuclear Age.

It has required

a complete revamping of Swiss defense strategy.

They can

no longer depend upon the Alps’ mountain ranges surrounding
the Swiss valleys to protect them In the same manner as

before.

The Alps can and do serve a valuable service to

the Swiss* new concept of defense, however.

Besides their

historic role as protector against land Invasion, the Swiss
use the mountains for storing foodstuffs and war material
in their vast natural caverns.

They serve as bomb shelters

and as a natural civil defense system.

The Swiss also use

the mountains for their air defense system*

They have hard-

encd missile sites and anti-aircraft gun emplacements strung
throughout.
In the early 1950* s, the Swiss military planners devised
a new strategy for defending Switzerland from the modern

weapons of war.

Instead of the old strategy of a “static

defense,” where the army would hold off the invaders as long
as possible and then retreat to a mountain redoubt, the new

concept calls for increased flexibility in the armed forces.
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The new army was to be a mobile one, having the capacity
to

move quickly from one Swiss frontier to the other.
Importantly, the Swiss built up their airforce.

More

In 1950

,

they bought 100 British Hunter Jet fighters to bolster their

air capabilities.*

They have placed heavy emphasis on civil

defense by employing radar with infrared equipment, not
only In the mountain areas but also in the valleys.

It Is

estimated that at least one-tenth of the population serves
in the new mobile civilian army.

More recently, Switzerland

has outfitted her forces with tactical nuclear weapons to

fully modernize her fortifications.

In 1954

,

over 400 million

Swiss francs went for defense, and that figure Is now undoubt-

edly higher.

Finally, ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles

are stockpiled in the mountain caverns along with the con-

ventional weapons of war.

Given these improvements, it would seem that the Swiss
have maintained a credible defense In spite of the new cir-

cumstances facing them.

But,

that credibility has yet to be

tested, and until It is, the traditional Swiss policy of armed

neutrality remains in abeyance.

Yet, having nothing to

replace it, the Swiss must depend upon it for their security,
if they hope to remain neutral.

*In 1962, the Swiss ordered from France the Dossault
Mirage III fighter jet.

^

‘

*nd

'

x-

t

*

Solidarity

.

In many

circles, it is a little known fact that Switzerland does

not belong to the United Nations.

Such a circumstance

raises genuine surprise upon its discovery, because the
Swiss have the reputation of being the most pacifist and

humanitarian people in the international community.

There-

fore, it is automatically assumed that the Swiss would be

a stalwart supporter of an international organization such
as the

United Nations whose announced

purpose is peace.

This assumption is not far from correct, because the Swiss
have chosen to support the United Nations from without.
This position is predicated on two elements; first, Swit-

zerland^ experience as

a member of the ill-fated League

of Nations and secondly, the political nature of the United

Nations as suggested by its charter.
In 1920,

Switzerland joined the League of Nations after

a bitter domestic debate resulted in a narrow victory at the

polls for the proponents of membership.. The controversy

over membership actually arose because of the obligations of

members to employ sanctions against an aggressor State.

Such

provisions are noted in Article 16 of the Covenant:
Should any member of the League resort to
war on disregard of its covenants under Articles
or 15 it shall ipso facto be deemed to
12, 13
have committed an act of war against all other
Members of the League, which hereby undertake
1.

,

,
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immediately to subject it to the severance of
all trade or financial relations, the prohibition
of all intercourse between their nationals and
the prevention of all financial, commercial or
personal Intercourse between the nationals of
the covenant-breaking State and the nationals
of any other State, whether a Member of the
League or not.
It shall be the duty of the Council In
2.
such case to recommend to the several
Governments concerned what effective military, naval or airforce the members of the
League shall severally contribute to the
armed forces to be used to protect the
covenants of the League. 7

This requirement is completely Incompatible with the obli-

gations of permanent neutrality as practised by the Swiss.
But the League decided to make an exception for Switzerland
in order that she might join.

Under the new arrangements,

Switzerland was not bound to participate in military operations or sanctions Instituted by the League.

However, she

was bound to participate in economic sanctions.

These

measures were taken on Switzerland’s behalf In order that
she might maintain her neutrality while participating in the

International organization.
was referred to

as

*

’’This

dl f ferential*

compromise arrangement
g

or ’qualified* neutrality.”''

The Swiss found membership in the League an uncomfortable

position even with their ’’associate” status.

The Swiss*

participation in purely economic sanctions was not without
its political trappings.

The failures of the collective

security system resulted in the ’’political” application of
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economic sanctions so that those States participating In
such actions were Involved In political dealings.

Switzer-

land was In danger of losing her neutrality If she continued

along this course.

In 1938, no longer able to accept these

conditions, Switzerland requested to be released of her

obligations to the Covenant.

She was restored to her former

status of "unqualified” neutrality by the League.

When the question of membership In the United Nations
arose after the Second World War, the experiences of the
League were still fresh in the minds of many Swiss who feared

Infringement upon their neutrality.

The second basis for

the Swiss rejection of United Nations’ membership lies in

the basics of the Charter.

Although the Charter is more

flexible than the Covenant, there are, nevertheless, serious

problems regarding the compatibility of membership In the

United Nations and permanent neutrality.

Under Article 43,

members may be called upon by the Security Council to apply
military and economic sanctions against any State found guilty
of a breach of peace.

Furthermore, Articles

2,

3,

^1,

and 43 of the Charter show plainly that Its spirit and text
are opposed to a fundamental neutrality such as is and has

been for 150 years, the cornerstone of Swiss foreign policy.

Article 4l implies that members of the World Organization are
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bouhd to give the United Nations every assistance

any

action It may take and to refrain from giving assistance
to any State against which the United Nations arc taking

preventive or enforcement action d

Furthermore, It was

one of the conditions of admission to the San Francisco

Conference In 19^5. at which the Charter was adopted, that
States demonstrate their desire for peace by declaring war

on Germany and Its allies.

Much of the Swiss argument for not joining the United
Nations was discussed In 19^6 by William E. Rappard, an

authority on Switzerland.*

Rappard*

s

position is based upon

his study of the powers given to the Security Council by
the Charter.

He

finds that

all nations, when they join

the United Nations, surrender to the Security Council their

right to peace and war.

(This being true of all nations

except the five big powers with veto power in the Security
Council.)

Moreover, he asserts that ’’...for Switzerland to

consent to act upon the Instructions of the Security Council,
a body on which it is neither directly nor indirectly repre-

sented, would be to forfeit its claim to national Independence.”'
He

further argues that the United Nations should not ask

Switzerland to abandon Its neutrality, and that Switzerland

U. e 7, ’’The United Nations and Switzerland,”
*Rapparc?
Annals of the American Academy of F olltical and Soci --'1 Sd r ncf
6: “64
2«
-71, July, 19^6.
,

.
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should

given some kind of United Nations’ "associate”

-be

membership along the lines of the League’s compromise.
xj.e

feels that there is a valuable place for Swiss neutrality.

There was also great reluctance by the Swiss to accept

membership in the

United Nations because of the power

politics inherent in any organization of universal membership.

It was felt at this time that the United Nations

would be

a

political organization, and that it would be

practically Impossible for the Swiss to remain outside the
political arena should they join.

(The basis for this

argument has largely been eroded by the success of other

neutrals in the United

Nations to remain outside the

politics of that organization.

Also, the United Nations has

not turned out to be as politically oriented or active as
was previously predicted.)

Because of these and other reasons,* the Swiss have
not applied for membership in the United Nations.

Though

the debate over this issue continues even today, the conflict

between neutrality and internationalism has been solved or
overcome by the Swiss acceptance of

other non-political missions.
to the United

*A

a

humanitarian and

Although she does not belong

Nations, Switzerland is one of the most

sample poll of Swiss citizens resulted in these findings
52,000 polled.
In favor of unconditional neutrality: 58 . 8 %
In favor of United Nations membership, b„.t keep
neutrality: 38.2$
In favor of abandoning neutrality: 3$

"International" countries in Europe; one of the most open
to the external world.

The Swiss consider it their duty

to ease the plight of the world.

Moreover, "Switzerland

is so well aware of the danger of

being imprisoned in its

neutrality ... .that it does not neglect any occasion for

making effective, whenever possible, its participation in
an international organization."

1

"'

.Among her many member-

ships in international organizations affiliated with the
United. Nations are membership in the United Nations Edu-

cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Inter-

national Refugee Organization, the

International Court of

Justice, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Inter-

national Postal Union, the International Labor Organization
and many more.

Geneva has been called the "International

City," because many of these organizations have their head-

quarters located there.

The most significant of these is

the International Red Cross.

Finally,

"Switzerland seems almost as if fated by Its

geographical situation, as well as prepared by Its history,
to fulfill the international, duties closest to the root

idea of neutrality.""^

In fact, the Swiss consider inter-

national solidarity as the natural complement of neutrality;
the only means of giving it positive value and the only way
to reconcile the need for security of a small nation with

the promotion of an international community.

It

1

s

these

goals that the Swiss tirelessly pursue outside the confines
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of United Nations membership.

Summary

.

Our discussion of Swiss neutrality has failed

to distinguish major differences resulting from the advent

of the cold war from those of her historical period.

Such

a distinction was necessary with the policies of neutrality

of Sweden and Finland.

However, in most respects, the cold

war has not been a major Influence for change in Swiss policies.
Since 1815, under the form of permanent neutrality, Switzer-

land has clung to neutrality In times of peace

and.

war.

Moreover, her claims have for the most part been respected
by the international community throughout the many changes In
the political climate.

In fact, her concept of neutrality

has come to serve as the example for those States portraying

themselves as neutral in the cold war.

It serves as a credible

example to follow, because Swiss neutrality is held In great
esteem, both inside and outside of the country.

Although Switzerland refrains from Involvement in international politics, hers is not a policy of isolation and never
has been.

Because her neutrality has the confidence of the

international community, she does not find herself limited
to those policies of strict neutrality as does a nation like

Finland which must find ways to enhance her credibility.

She

can take a more practical approach, because, for the most
part, Switzerland sets the standards for neutrality.

Swiss
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"practical neutrality,” though It may diverge slightly from
"legal neutrality,” Is likely to find favorable responses

among the Great Powers.

These powers realize with what

reverence the Swiss hold to neutrality, and that they are not
about to jeopardize their privileged position.
The Swiss are fervently neutral today, because they
are fervently Swiss.

They realize that had It not been

f or

the neutrality of their country in the past, they would long

since have lost thei r national unity and, indeed, forfeited

their national existence.

One observer noted that "A foreig-

ner who observes from the outside this peaceful and prosperous
country does not always grasp the effort required to insure
its stability, to smooth out the inevitable tensions which

crop up in a multilingual country, and to compensate for
t.he

attractions exerted by the various national cultures.

This small nation is more sensitive and vulnerable than surface appearance indicates, and the neutrality which the Swiss

cantons have been led to adopt to maintain the federal link
remains today the cement of their unity.

”

The mere renun-

ciation of neutrality would split the confederation *nto two
or three parts, none of which could avoid an alliance with

more powerful neighbors.
Finally, "...the maintenance of neutrality really does

rest in the last resort upon their (Swiss) own strength and

.

this In turn Involves three things: the unity of the cantons,

eternal vigilance, and the willingness to carry the heavy

personal

and.

financial burden of defense."^

1
'

These burdens

have been accepted willingly by the Swiss, because they know
the rewards of

cost

such responsibilities by far outweigh the

CHAPTER VII

AUSTRIA AND NEUTRALITY

History

.

Unlike the three previously cited nations of

Sweden, Finland and Switzerland, Austria has no historical

tradition of neutrality.

Austrian neutrality dates hack to

only 1955 when the four powers of the Soviet Union, England,

France and the United States agreed to the Austrian State
Treaty, establishing the permanent neutralization of that

nation.

Indeed, Austria has held statehood only since 1919 .

Previously to that, what Is now modern or present-day Austria
was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

For centuries,

this Empire was a formidable Great Power of the European

continent.

Ruled by the Hapsburg dynasty, it was constantly

embroiled in offensive

which were

and defensive military conflicts

due to either the aggressive aims of the Haps-

burgs or to Austria’s central geographic position is Europe’s

backdoor guardian against Asian conquerors, notably the Turks.
Because they were an Instrumental part of this Empire and

holders of

a

great amount of power, the Austrians have never

had to rely upon the politics of neutrality to insure their

security.

Consequently, they have been on

other in all of Europe’s classic conflicts.

one side or the

s

:

The history of Austrian statehood since 1919 has been
a storayand uncertain one.

The peacemakers of 1919 took

the truncated rump of the Hapsburg Empire and constituted
the Republic of Austria.

Comprised mostly of German-

speaking peoples, Austria lacked either the will or the

means to existence.

Between the wars, it scarcely had an

active foreign policy.

Politically, many Austrians wished

for an Anschluss with Germany.

This was forbidden by the

Allies in the Treaty of Versailles.

Economically, Austria*

existence depended on numerous loans from the League of
Nations.
suspended.

However, once the depression hit, this aid was

Austria found herself pressured more and more,

both internally and externally by the German National Socialist propaganda,

that the only solution to her desperate

straits was union with Germany.

In March of 1938, Hitler's

Germany forced through the Anschluss
independence.

,

crushing Austrian

Thus ended the Austrian's brief but heroic

struggle for independence.

Gereld Frankenstein depicts

Austria's inter-war condition rather eloquently when he
wrl tes

Were I to choose a symbol of Austria's
struggle in the years following the first
world war, I would choose the famous group
in the Vatican called Laocoon Laocoon
fighting heroically and desperately against
the overwhelming pressure of the serpents,
his two sons around him, almost succumbing,
lifting their arms for help.-

—
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World War Two ended with Austria liberated from Nazi
rule but occupied by the four victorious allies.

Despite

promises of a quick "Austrian solution,” the Allied occupation lasted, for ten years.

During those years, she became

a fecal point In the cold war, thus creating almost insur-

mountable obstacles for settlement.

Neither the East nor

the West was willing to abandon Austria to the other.

tria depicts a snail rowlngboat in a storm sea with a

"Auscrex^

of lbur elephants each pulling in a different direction.”

0

Moreover, the deadlock over Austria led most Austrians to

believe that the^r country would be the prize over which

World War Three would be fought.

"They see their country

as the cockpit In which at Austrian expense the Pour Great

Powers fight out their economic and political rivalries
today; tomorrow they fear it may be the scene of the out-

break of

a.

more bloody conflict.”i

Austrian State Treaty

.

When the announcement of the

Austrian State Treaty was made in 1955, there was understandably much surprise in both cold war camps.

The groundwork

for the agreement had been laid by careful Austrian diplomacy.

In 19 49
/

,

the government announced that it would accept

a treaty without a guarantee of its protection as it hoped,

for protection by the United Nations.

Using the good offices
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of India to promote Austria*

s

cause with the Soviet Union,

agreement to Austrian Independence was reached In
on April 15, 1955 •*

Moscow

After nearly 300 fruitless Elg Power

negotiation sessions since 19 ^ 6

,

compromise

and agreement

were reached on the four-power evacuation of Austria.

Those

agreements are embodied in the Austrian State Treaty.
The Issues of Austrian neutrality and independence were

actually negotiated on a bi-lateral basis between the Soviet
Union and Austria.

After two days of negotiations in Moscow,

the Austrians and Russians concluded the "Moscow Memorandum”
on April 15, 1955*

Under the terms of this formal agreement,

"Austria accepted the obligation to practice permanent neu-

trality of the type maintained by Switzerland, to obtain from
the Austrian parliament a commitment to permanent neutrality,
to take

appropriate measures to obtain international recog-

nition of this neutral status, and to request and accept a
guarantee by the four powers of the inviolability and integrity
of the territory of the Austrian state.

The Austrian dele-

gation gave assurances that "...the Austrian Republic Intends
not to join any military alliance or permit military bases
on her territory and will pursue a policy of independence in

regard to all states."'

Other

commitments given by the

*The Soviet Union was fearful that the Western Allies
might halt their quest for a united Austria and. Incorporate
the Western zones into NATO.

8?

Austrians Included reparations

1

payments to the Soviet

Union

of 150 million dollars and the delivery of one million tons
of crude oil annually over the next ten years.

Most important

to the Soviets was the Austrian acquiescence to make a

declaration "...in a form imposing upon Austria an international obligation, that Austria will maintain permanent

neutrality of the same type as that maintained by Switzerland.
The Soviet Union, on its part, agreed to recognize the declara-

tion of neutrality

and to participate in a four-power guaran-

tee of Austrian territory.

The four-power guarantee came one month later in Vienna

with the signing of the Austrian State Treaty.

Tt provided

for the establishment of a sovereign and democratic Austria

within the frontiers of 1938-

(Articles 1 and 5)*

The rights

of non-German minorities were guaranteed, and an Anschluss was

forbidden (Articles

A

and 7)»

Austria was allowed to keep

an army of whatever size it wished, but atomic weapons were
There were to be no reparations

forbidden (Article 13)*
except those cited in the

Moscow

Memorandum (Articles 21

and 22).

From the Austrian point of view, the very heart of the

Treaty is Article 20.

It terminated the four-power control

in Austria and provided that the occupying
be evacuated

within ninety days.

The Great

forces were to
Poi\rers,

both

°

‘

Allied and Associated, promised to support the Austrian
application Into the United Nations.

Surprisingly, the

Treaty has no mention of Austrian permaneny neutrality.
However,

Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov proposed that

the four powers, ”... shall respect and observe a statement
of Austria’s permanent neutrality of the kind observed by
Swi tzerland ."

Such a statement of Austrian neutrality was soon

forthcoming from the Austrian parliament.

On October 26,

1955, that body enacted the Constitutional Law of Neutrality.

Article

I

reads:
(1) For the purpose of the lasting maintenance
of her Independence externally, and for the
purpose of the Inviolability of her territory,
Austria declares by her own free will her

perpetual neutrality. Austria will maintain
and defend this with all means at her disposal.
(2) For the securing of this purpose in all
future times, Austria will not join any military alliances and will not permit the establishment of any foreign military bases on
her territory.

Nations of the international community were quick to

respond to the State Treaty and to the Constitutional Law of
Neutrality.

Acknowledgements by governments such as the United

States were soon forthcoming.

’’The

Government of the United

States has taken cognizance of this Constitutional Law and

recognizes the perpetual neutrality of Austria as defined there!
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Needless to say, there was much speculation as to why
the Soviet Union, after conceding nothing on Austria for

nearly ten years, apparently did a complete about-face.
Rome think that Russia agreed to the State Treaty because
she wanted to make Austria an example for the other small

Western European nations to follow Instead of their joining
NATO.

She hoped that Austrian Independence through neutral-

ity would act as the lure to these nations.

that

”

Others speculate

...from the Soviet point of view, Austria*

s

neutral

freedom was simply a Danublan sprat to catch the German
mackerel.

Here again, the Austrian example Is to serve

as enticement for a neutral Germany.

Still others point to

the desire of the new Soviet leaders to appease the West
in the post-Stalin era of co-existence or cite with some

credibility the Soviet desire to sever NATO military lines
of communication from Italy to Germany

and.

fears of exposing

Russian soldiers to the corrupting luxury of Western life.
No matter what the reason or reasons for Soviet con-

cessions, the fact remains that Russian acquiescence to

Austrian independence via neutrality paved the way to the
re-establishment of Austrian sovereignty.

Whether the

prolongation of that sovereignty depends on continued Soviet

acaulescence is as yet an unanswered question.

It is, however,
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as serious a consideration for the policy makers of Austria

as

i

is for Finland.

1

In many ways,

it is the key to

Austria's policy of neutrality.
*

”stri °r Neutrality

.

The development of guidelines

for a policy of Austrian neutrality began In 1956.

Adjust-

ments In that policy continue even today, depending upon
the political environment in which such a policy must exist.

Nevertheless, there are several set themes for Austrian

neutrality which have emerged since 1956, and which, for
the most part, probably will not change drastically.

The broad and formal guidelines for Austrian neutrality

were explained in 1953

"by

Dr.

Bruno Krelsky, former Austrian

foreign minister.* He explains that ’’Actually it is not
accurate to speak of neutrality in peacetime because what
the term means is non-participation in war.’’--- Eut, he claims

that neutrality does Impose certain obligations in peacetime
as well.

These obligations are:

neutral country cannot Join a military
alliance in time of peace.
(1) A

neutral country must bar military bases
from its territory.
(2) A

neutral country must not accept any
commitments economic or political which
would jeopardize its neutrality in time of
war •
(3) A

—

Austria follows these minimum obligations of neutrality

Krelsky, Bruno, ’’Austria Draws the Balance,
January, 1959, PP« 269-281.
A ffai rs
•M

,

it

Foreign
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1n the strictest sense, since her most pressing goal has

been to build credibility for her neutrality.

Apart from

these obligations, Austria has developed a foreign policy

which is more flexible than her European neighbor of
Switzerland.

Moreover, the statement by Soviet Foreign

Minister Molotov that Austrian neutrality should develop
along the lines of the Swiss example seems to be completely
out of context with definite historical facts which prevent
the use of the Swiss model for Austria.

Furthermore, the reference to Swiss neutrality as a

model for Austria is Irrelevant and impractical, because the
Austrians have no tradition of neutrality from which to start.
A

tradition of neutrality and the faith in such a policy

cannot be accomplished overnight.

It took Switzerland over

two hundred years to evolve her ties to neutrality, and it

cannot be expected that Austria would accomplish such a

process in a decade or even two decades.

History and the

fluctuations in political environments simply do not suggest
such an occurrence.

Statements by the Austrians at the Berlin Conference
of 195^ clearly outlined, the major definitions of any Austrian

neutrality.

"It is the desire of the Austrian people to live

in peace and friendship with all nations.

Austria desires

to make the principles of the United Nations Charter her own

.

9?

and to become a worthy member of that great family of

nations. ”

But Austria doesn’t want to become politically

Isolated.

They want to keep friendly relations with all

states, her political orientation is, however, towards
the West.

It was for this reason that Austria joined the

United Nations in 1956 soon after gaining her independence.
She Joined, because it would bring her intematl onal recog-

nition.

Also,

’’Such

membership implied a measure of security

which we could not have found elsewhere.”

'3

This was the

first major indication that the Swiss model would, not snrve

Austria well, and that there were necessary departures from
that model.

Austria has used her membership in the United

Nations to activate her neutrality in

a

positive direction.

Her humanitarian orientation was clearly demonstrated during
the Hungarian Revolt of 1956.

She has continued those acti-

through the United Nations organ* ^tl ons

vities

What has occurred in Austria Is that ’’...since the State
Treaty.

.

.Austria has developed

a

new kind of neutralism,

something less negative and more actively European in spirit
1
than the neutrality of Switzerland.” ^

This European spirit

has been greatly aided by the domestic situation within

Austria which finds a coalition of Christian Democrats and
Socialists governing effectively.

This is important, because
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serves as a showcase for other European nations

x^ho maj^

be having difficulty reconciling the two dominant
European

political trends represented by these two groups.
It has become clear that the Austrians, while embracing

neutrality In the military sense, reject It Ideologically.
They have strong cultural and historical ties with the West.
’’Neutrality with us is not a state of mind.

We will promise

to enter no military alliance and to allow no foreign bases

on our soil.

Beyond that, we are of the West, and our hearts

cannot be neutral.”^

'

She has consistently promoted this

position by joining the United Nations In 1966, expanding
trade with the West,

joining the Council of Europe In 1966

and soliciting loans from the United States Instead of the

Soviet Union.

But her most daring actions in this direction

were during the Hungarian revolt of 1956 when she actively

aided refugees fleeing the Russians and when she exposed
and destroyed a Soviet front organization In Austria.

Both

actions brought vocal threats and objections from the Soviets,
but,

In turn, the actions procured acknowledgements of

admiration and respect from the rest of the international
community.

Furthermore, when Chancellor Julius Raab, knoxrn

as the ’’architect of Austrian neutrality,” proposed Ideologi-

cal neutrality in hopes of not offending the Russians and

possibly securing agreements from them to lessen the reparations

'

9 **

payments, he was opposed and defeated In 1956 by others,
such as Foreign Minister Leopold Fig] who said: "We are

militarily a neutral State but there Is no neutrality of
spirit for us, and therefore no ’neutralism*

upon

In 1956,

being threatened by the Soviets for their actions

during the Hungarian revolt, Chancellor Raab, who reversed
his stance, answered those threats by stating that Austrian

neutrality does not mean "a colorless neutralism In political questions."' '?
1

By i 960

,

two themes had emerged from the conflict

between Austrian’s Western conscience and her Eastern
commitments to neutrality.

First was the Government’s

determination to make Its foreign policy pragmatic, not
predetermined by any model such as that of the Swiss.
Secondly, Austrian neutrality was only In the military

sphere.

President Adolf Schaerf’s announcement In 1957

confirms this position.

"We attach great Importance to our

neutrality being regarded as a military one.

In other aspects

and particularly In all questions of culture, we do not wish
to be tied to any historically molded, pattern."

]

8

Austria’s practice of pragmatic neutrality Is not without
limitations.

That ’s, the Austrians realize that It was

Soviet agreement to their neutrality which enabled them to
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gain the* r Independence ana rid their country of the occupation
forces.

Their leaders are not about to turn their backs on

the Russian bear and Its desires.

To be sure, Austrian

leaders have so far been able to successfully thwart Soviet

threats

and demands upon their practice of neutrality.

Tut

the hard questions still exist; how much does Austrian Inde-

pendence depend upon Soviet acceptance of Austrian policies?

How far can the Austrians venture without antagonizing the
Kremlin and pushing the Soviets Into a "Hungarian or Czechoslovakian solution?

It Is a situation which Austrian diplo-

mats, like the Finns, have to be constantly aware of.

(There

are elements w*th!n Austria who do push for an "appeasement

policy."

These forces warned against the joining of the

United Nations, because it would bring too much international

attention on Austria and might contain political trappings

which a young neutral could not cope with.

They also argue

against close economic ties with Western Europe for fear that
they would antagonize Russia.)

Despite the International guarantee of its neutrality

embodied in the Austrian State Treaty, the presence of Russian
tanks and soldiers on Austrian border^ during the Hungarian

Revolt in 1956 brought home to the Austrians that "...the
simple fact of being legally in the right has never in history
saved any country from having its neutrality violated by another

s
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country...."

IQ

Like the Swiss, Swedes and Finns, the Austrians

realize that the best guarantee of permanent neutrality is
a strong army and the unshakable determination to defend
thi

neutrality.

Consequently, Austria has built up her defenses

in order to guard her position.

Because of the ban on atomic

weapons placed on her by the State Treaty, she can never
hope to have an adequate defense against any nuclear aggressor.
Any thoughts of defending successfully her neutrality by means
of arms are pure fantasy as long as the restrictions remain.

Fortunately, she has yet to depend upon her inadequate defenses
for her guarantee.
of

She,

like Finland, must rely upon a policy

keeping out of war.
Summary

.

Neutral Austria is in an unique and unenviable

position of having common frontiers with two Warsaw Pact
States (Czechoslovakia and Hungary), two mainstays of NATO
(Italy

and.

West Germany) and two other countries, neutral

and uncommitted like Itself (Switzerland and Yugoslavia).

Consequently, "Austrian neutrality ’s only a function of

international eauili bri um.

.

.

.

It follows then that Austrian

foreign policy must always aim to help maintain the balance
of power by contributing in all ways possible toward lessen-

ing international tension."

^

The examples of Switzerland

and Sweden suggest that a successful neutral needs, as well
as care and restraint in her external policies, national
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unity and stability in her internal policies, economic

viability and military strength sufficient to deter any
would-be aggressor from an easy conquest.
present, Austria

1

s

Up to the

leaders have demonstrated ample skills

in their diplomacy,

but it is too early to be confident

of the country* s internal unity or its economic strength.

Austria’s leaders have already shown concern over her inadequate defenses.

The failures of the balance of power

have historically taken their toll of neutral States who

depended upon that delicate balance of forces for their
security.

"It would be rash to assert that the post-1955

neutralization of the Austrian Federal Republic is deeply
entrenched.

So far,

it has not been severely tested."

21

'

Meanwhile, Austrian diplomats remain adamant in their

practical neutrality

w^.th the

country’s ties to the West

and its economic concessions to the Soviets.

Despite its

drawbacks and limitations, neutrality for. Austria has meant
Independence for the last fifteen years.
international recognition for that State.

It has also meant

This was clearly

underscored by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in observance
of the tenth anniversary of Austrian independence in 1965

when he concluded:
While fully honoring her international obligations under the treaty and scrupulously adhering to the policy of neutrality which she
adopted in October, 1955. Austria has not
hesitated to follow an independent and positive
foreign policy in the interests of international
Justice and peace.

PART III
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

CHAPTER VIII

THE FOUR EUROPEAK

Introduction

.

NEUTRALS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

In Part II, we discussed the general

policies of neutrality practised by Austria, Finland, Sweden
and Switzerland in order to illuminate the basic guidelines
of neutrali ty followed by each individual State and to clar'

ify the political environment from which such policies evolved.
It was made clear that although these four States definitely

have a Western orientation in terms of history, culture and

political ideology, this does not lessen their commitment to

neutrality or non-alllance.

But most important in the dis-

cussion of these four neutrals is the acknowledgement that,

though they may have much in common, each adheres to a specific form of neutrality dictated by its own Interests and by

its position vis-a-vis the cold war

antagonists.

More speci-

fically, the different political environments in which these

four States maintain their Independence create differences
in the interpretation of neutrality.

This has resulted in

the practice of neutrality at various levels,

some rigid,

others more flexible and practical in regard to specific
Issues confronting these nations.
Cne of these issues where the different levels of neu-

trality become apparent is European integration*

Because
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both the

United States and the Soviet Union have different

conceptions of a

United Europe and because the Impetus of

the current Integration movement has come from and Involves

only the western half of Europe, the neutral States desiring
to associate with the Integration movement find themselves

faced with numerous dilemmas.

The desire for security

creates the dilemma of association or non-assoclatlon with
a military

alliance system. .The desire for economic growth

and stabilization produces a dilemma over economic associ-

ation with some parties at the exclusion of others.

Finally,

the desire for neutrality poses a dilemma between political

Isolation

and International cooperation.

In most cases,

these dilemmas add up to a choice between survival or extinction, militarily, economically and politically.

Thus, the

European neutral Is faced with many difficult decisions concerning Its role in the integration movement.

How these four

neutrals have reacted to these dilemmas presented by efforts
of European unity Is the subject of Part

HI.

We shall be examining some regional organizations In

which these four neutrals have either joined, seek to join
.or

have debated joining.

This examination will enable us

to see clearly the dilemmas faced by these nations as they

seek to maintain their neutrality.

But more Importantly,
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such an examination should illustrate the varying
degrees
of neutrality practised by each, relative to its
political

circumstances in regard to the specific issue of European
integration.

Specifically, we shall examine the European

regional organizations of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Economic Community (EEC).
Of these two organizations,

only in EFTA do any of the four

neutrals actually hold membership.

(Austria, Sweden and

Switzerland are full members while Finland is an associate
member.) Because of the political nature of the Treaty of
Rome, none of the neutrals at present hold full or associate

membership in the EEC.

(Austria, Switzerland and Sweden

have sought associate status.)

European Integration

.

Since the closing stages of the

Second World War, there has been a movement toward greater

European unity.

The nations of Western Europe have come to

realize the vast economic and social advantages of removing
the barriers between them and working together on the many

common problems.

Most of the success in this endeavor of

unifying the nations of Europe has b^en in the economic
sphere.

Indeed, as long as membership in the European instl

tut ions required no sacrifice of a State's sov

ignty and

independence, most of the nations of Europe, including
the neutrals, have been very willing to participate in

.

>

integration.

0?

In many ways, thr one claim to success of such

organizations as the Organization for European Economic Co-

operation (OEEC)* and the Council of Europe ^r that they have
^een able to solicit nearly all of the nations of Western

Europe as members.

This Is sol ely because they require no

subjugation of Individual States* political rights ns

prerequisite for membership.
much

a

Yet, neither do they represent

of an accomplishment in the integration process other

than as symbols of intent.
On the other hand, the creation of common institutions

requiring members to sacrifice
has been largely unsuccessful.

a bit of

their sovereignty

The movement of the Euro-

pean federalists for political Integration has found stiff

opposition in several nations of Europe, notably Erl tain
and the European neutrals.

For Britain, with her Common-

wealth ties and her tradition of Isolation from the continent, political integration would mean the scrapping of

that tradition, plus ties with her former Empire.

For those

nations attempting to maintain neutrality in time of peace
and war, political integration Is out of the question.

While they do endeavor to participate in international schemes
of economic and technical cooperation, they are opposed to

*Now
(OECD)

Organization for Economic and Cultural Development
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any form of political alignment which might endanger their

neutrality.
The reluctance on the part of Britain and the neutral

nations to agree to the political unification of Europe

meant that as long as the goal of unanimous membership in
the common institutions remained, there would be no sign-

ificant political integration.

Consequently, the early

years of integration were concerned with such organizations
as the CEEC where strict economic cooperation made wide-

spread participation possible.

The creation of the OEEC

in 19^8 was solely to achieve the economic recovery of war-

shattered Europe, and its success was ensured by total

cooperation from the European nations.
Spurred on by the

success of the OEEC, some Member

countries of that organization made plans for further cooperThey proposed

ation through inter-governmental institutions.

to fully integrate their national economies by means of common

institutions under a common authority.

In 1951

1

under the

guidance of Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, the
six

Member States of Belgium, France, the German Federal

Republic, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands created a common

market for coal and steel known as the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC).

Subsequent accomplishments of this

"Community method" include the European Atomic Energy Community

1

EURATOM)

and the European Economic Community (EEC), both

springing from the twin Treaties of Rome in 1957.
It is at these points in time that the movement to

integrate Europe begins to separate.
for a
ECSC,

The negotiations

supra-national authority, envisaged by the Six in
EURATOM

and the EEC, marked a parting of ways between

those States such as Britain, Sweden, Switzerland and Finland,

who sought only economic cooperation and the six Member

States advocating the "Community method."

By their actions,

the Six demonstrated that they were ready to oush ahead with
the unification of Europe in order that they might benefit

from the advantages of coordinated political and economic

policies.

The leading federalists,

such as Robert Schuman

and Jean Monnet, were willing to abandon their goal of unanimity, hoping that partial integration would convince the

reluctant States to abandon their traditional concepts of

neutrality or Isolation.
It was at this point that the dilemmas of European

integration began to arise for the four neutrals.

For with

the success and growth of each community organization, especi-

ally the EEC, the neutrals* self-inflicted isolation brought

Increasing symptoms of economic hardship.

,

for them to

join these experiments in supra-national communities would

i°r

mean abandonment of their neutrality and probable political
adversity.

Thus,

their choices

wer?'

narrowed to: continued

isolation, experimenting in political integration or seeking
an alternative economic organization to combat the EEC.

That

they chose the third alternative is hardly a surprise con-

sidering the consequences of the other two.

European Free Trade Association

(

EFTA

)

,

By creating the

these nations would

reap the benefits of economic cooperation that they had realized in OEEC, while simultaneously they did not have to make

any concessions on their neutrality.

European Free ^ode

A

ssoci atlon "nd Fin? and

.

At

a.

meeting

of the OEEC Council in July, 1956, while the drafting of the

Rome Treaties for the EEC and EURATOM was still in progress,
Britain put forward the

idea, of

an all-European free trade area

embracing the "Six” and other European countries.

The British

proposals envisaged the abolition of all tariffs and other
barriers to trade between the Member States over a period of

years--at the same time allowing

each Member to retain for

itself the freedom to determine tariff levels and trade policies

towards third countries.

These proposals received unanimous

acceptance within the framework of the OEEC.

Negotiations

for such a plan were initiated but soon broke down because of
the withdrawal of French support.

The problem was not that
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the British suggestion? were not feasible but that
the "Six”

and particularly the French Government- found It Impossible
to change their position, namely, that the Treaty of Rome

had created a new situation to which the rest of the European

nations had to adapt their policies.

In other words,

In the economic relations of Western Europe non-dls crimination

on

an OEEC basis had come to an end; to re-establish the

economic unity of the Continent, Britain and Scandinavia was
a task of the future,’’'

1

In response to the discriminating attitude of the ’’Sly,”

a group of seven countries, -Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal,

Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kindgom, now known as the

"Seven,” sought to form a free trade area among themselves.

Their a*m was to create favourable conditions for forming a
free trade area embracing all of the CEEC countries.

In the

meantime, -they felt obliged to confer the advantages of free
trade on their own populations who numbered approximately

ninety million people.

While they hoped to demonstrate that

the free trade area technique was workable and In the end

advantageous, It is more accurate to say that the EFTA was
created in response to the discriminatory and selective EEC.
The "Seven” felt obliged to offset as much as possible the

economic advantages resulting from membership In the EEC In
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order to protect themselves Individually.

After six months of negotiation, the Convention establishing EFTA was completed and Initiated in Stockholm, Sweden,
on November 20,

found In Article

1959*
2.

The principal objectives of EFTA are

They are:

to promote sustained economic activity, full
employment, increased productivity and optimum
use of resources, financial stability and continuous improvement of living Standards;

a)

to ensure that trade between the Member States
takes place under conditions of fair competition on terms as nearly equal as possible;

b)

c) to avoid significant disparities between Member States in the conditions of supply of raw
materials produced within EFTA and
;

to contribute to the expansion and harmonious
development of world trade and to the progressive removal of barriers to It.
d)

Apart from these objectives of operation, the signatories
had two primary alms In mind; to promote arrangements with
the EEC which would lead to the establishment of

European Market, and

a

single

to create among themselves a free market

within which trade could take place unhampered by tariffs
or other barriers.
The absence of any political alms by the EFTA Is not

purely happenstance but rather by design.

It was the poli-

tical obligations of the Rome Treaty of the EEC which aroused

opposition to it and made It impossible for any of the ’'Seven"
to join,

especially the neutrals.

The cooperation provided

.

for by the EFTA Convention is. In fact, essentially commercial
in nature with few direct and immediate obligations
bearing on

the economic and social policies of the Member States.

The

EFTA countries set out to do something less than the EEC.
had no political federation in mind.

They

Economically, they argued

that it was possible for countries with disparate economic

structures to do Intelligent business together without committing themselves to institutions encroaching upon traditional

areas of national sovereignty.

Like the CEEC, the EFTA pro

vlded slight difficulties for neutrals because

4

t

was purely

economic and followed voting rule and decision- making via
unanlml ty
Yet,

the establishment' of EFTA did create grave problems

for one of the neutrals

— Finland.

Unlike Austria, Sweden

and Switzerland, Finland’s neutrality and Independence hinge
on placating the Soviet Union.

Finnish sovereignty is so

tenuous because of her important security position in regard
to the Soviet Union, that strict observance of neutrality Is
a

necessity.

It Is through the Finnish dilemma over membership

in EFTA that we begin to .see definitive differences in neu-

trality among the four neutrals.

Because EFTA Is a purely

economic organization, It raised little or no problem for
Austria, Sweden and Switzerland.

Eut because It is also a

purely Western European organization and excludes countries
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from the Eastern or Soviet bloc, for Finland to participate
^n it might be construed In Soviet eyes as partial or discrim-

inatory neutrality.

Desiring to guard against such an inter-

pretation and knowing that they would feel uncomfortable In
their neutrality should they join EFTA

,

the Finns decided

against full membership.
With the signing of the Stockholm Convention In 1959,
It soon became apparent to the Finns that If they were to

survive economically and, In the end, politically, they

must establish some method of collaboration with EFTA.

Already by 1957. because of high inflation and Industrial
conflicts over prices and wages, it was obvious that unless

Finland could remain competitive In her western markets,
she could be absorbed Into the Soviet orbit.

Moreover, the

Soviets were pushing for stronger Soviet-FInn economic ties
by way of Increased trade.

Isolation from her Western

markets would come to mean economic dependence on the Eastern
bloc nations, principally the Soviet Union.

It would also

mean a huge cut In foreign trade for the Finns.

At Its

highest, the share of the Eastern bloc In Finnish foreign

trade was 30 per cent.
fifth of the total.

Usually, It amounts to only one-

Three-fifths of Finland^ total exports,

chiefly wood and wood products, are sold In the thirteen
countries comprising EFTA and EEC.

While Finnish exports

s

no
here about equally divided between the two Western European

organizations, the creation of the EEC, Important though it
was as

a

marketing area for Finnish forest articles, did

not In itself signify a direct threat to Finnish export

competition.

This was due to the fact that the principal

countries competing with Finland In the export of forest

products were also outside the EEC so that Finland was not
placed In an unfavorable position In relation to them.
However, with the Implementation of the EFTA

chief

,

Finland*

competitors In forest articles, Sweden and Norway,

gained a decided advantage because of the lowering of tariffs;
thus endangering Finland’s competitive position.
EFTA Included Finland’s biggest customer,

Korrover,

Britain.

To

remain outride of EFTA would considerably weaken her position
In the British market and would endanger the large-scale

Investments made In her wood-processing Industries, as well
as generally diminish the prospects of Finland’s foreign trade.

Further complications arise when assessing Finland’s
bilateral trade with the Soviet Union.
m xportr

In 1959,

Finland’s

to the Soviet Union amounted to 16.8 per cent of

the total value of her exports.

Close to two-thirds of the

products sold to the Soviet- Union consisted of machines,
appliances and transportation equipment.

Although only

7

per

Ill

cent of all wood and wood products exported by the Finns
went to the Russians, the Soviet share of her exports In

metal and engineering products was as high as 72 per cent.
These

figures Indicate roughly the importance of the Soviet

Union as a market for Finland’s metal Industries.

In order

to retain this market, the Finns must maintain a level of

imports roughly equal to Its exports.

with the

EFT/i

To reach agreements

countries which would have the effect of

damaging the Finnish-Soviet trade In this vital area would
be totally unwise and untenable.

The need for collaboration with EFTA became more acute

when the other Scandinavian countries, with whom the establishment of a Nordic. Customs Union had been under discussion
for two or three years, now

announced that In view of the

altered circumstances created by the EEC and the
were no longer interested In such a project.
states,

EFT/',

they

As Relno Rossi

"Thus the only possibility that existed for Finland

to safeguard her commercial Interests In Western Europe was

that of endeavoring to Join EFTA."

Finland’s adherence to

neutrality meant that It was as Impossible for her to Join
the EEC as It was for iSweden, Austria and Switzerland.

Her

economic future In Jeopardy if she continued her isolation,

Finland was left with little choice.
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The Stockholm Convention provides for partly peti on
In EFTA without being a full-fledged member.

states that States may apply for
ship In EFTA

.

Article

4

l

full or associate member-

”The Council may negotiate an agreement

between the K ember States and any other State, union of
States or International organ! .zati on.

The association

agreement negotiated by the Council may provide for ”...
such reciprocal rights and obligations, common actions and

special procedures as may be appropriate.”^
By means of Article 4 l, the Council of EFT" was provided

with a great amount of leeway *n handling membership applications of countries with such complex problems as Finland's.
The EFTA members, well aware of the economic

and politic

consequences should Finland be forced to remain outside

tl e

western trade markets, were anxious to Include her as an
associate member.

Eut In doing so they dared not force her

to accept any obligations which would endanger her neutrality

or her commercial agreements with the Eastern bloc.
Finland, on the other hand, also anxious to participate
In the free trade area, realized that any move on Its part

must be made with caution and In consultation with the
Russians.

Therefore, during the negotiations with EFTA, wh 1 ch

began In January, i960, the Finnish Governemt devoted Its

primary attention to three points.

First, the establishment-
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of relations with EFT? must not lead to the creation of any

supra-national body that would restrict Finland’s right of
self-determination.

Secondly, the Finns aimed at an agree-

ment such as would take Into account the social and

circumstances of the

economic

country, ensuring a sufficient period

of adaption, particularly for some branches of the home market,

finally, the agreement should be of

a nature such as to

enable

Finland to fulfill and to honor all previously concluded

commercial treaties.

This last point was specifically intended

to guard the Soviet-FInni sh trade relationship.

Needless to say, this last point was the primary issue

throughout the negotiations, and It proved to be the most

difficult to implement.

By Nay of i960, a draft agreement,

signed at Lisbon, essentially fulfilled the first two basic
requirements.

The EFT? countries demonstrated great under-

standing of the difficulties in adapting Finland's industries
to the new circumstances.

duties was accomplished

Reduction of

in accord with EF1? standards, thus ensuring Finland a com-

petitive price on the Western market.

Finally, the EFT? made

a concession to Sovlet-Finnish trade.

Finland obtained the

right to retain

i.n

force some quantltati

x’e

Import restrictions

on liquid and solid fuels as well as fertilizers In order to

guarantee the import -export
and Russia.

balance existing between Finland

Here again, the EFT? countries demonstrated their

s

recognition of the special circumstances surrounding Finland*

neutrality and Soviet interests.
The third aim of the Finnish Government was not solved

by the Lisbon draft.

It posed a more difficult problem

because the Finnish-Soviet trade agreement contained a most-

favored-nation’s clause.

Since the Soviet Union was not a

member of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT),
and thus not bound to accept the limitations imposed by mem-

bership in a free trade area

oi

r

operations of such a clause, its'
beyond dispute.

customs union beyond

the.

•’wrldical validity was

Actually, only a small portion of the Soviet

Union’s exports would have been affected by tariff reductions,
but the Finns felt that an Important

Involved

.

1

ssue of principle was

Seeking to placate the Soviet Union and not affect

Its own interests, President Kekkonen sought to reach a nego-

tiated solution acceptable to both the EFTA and the Soviet
Union.

Because he did consult the Soviet Union on this step,

and because he had been communicating with Moscow over EFTA

membership since the negotiations began, Kekkonen encountered
stiff opposition from within Finland.

The.

feeling was that

the Austrians had not consulted the Russians when they Joined

the EFTA as a full member, and that for President Kekkonen
to do so was ,a slap in the face to Finland’s independence.

Nevertheless, Kekkonen desired to confer with the Soviets
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concerning

a

new customs treaty on

*

new bae 1

r

which, whi^r

guaranteeing the commercial benefits of the Soviet Union on
the Finnish market, would be compatible with the EFTA and
^a_tt principles.
I 960

Such an agreement was re^c ed
1

4

during President Kekkonen's visit to Moscow,

,

same time,

November,
it the

Soviet Premier Khrushchev Issued a communique

granting Finland permission to become

a

qualified member of

EFTA in order to ”... remain competitive in western markets.’’^

This statement gave Kekkonen and the Finns the confidence
to accept associate membership in the

EFT/'

in March, 1961.

-Although associate membership in a non-political

organization such as the EFTA seems like
portant step to most, the

fact-

a

small and unim-

that the Finns considered it

a momentous achievement of their foreign policy illustrates

clearly the major facet upon which their neutrality is based.
Despite their assurances to the Soviets of their unrelenting

dedication to neutrality, to make even the smallest move
toward the West presents the Finns with a major foreign policy

dilemma.

That their practice of neutrality must be more rigid

and stricter than

any other neutral in Europe was illustrated

when they attempted to take the smallest of the
to integrate Europe.
over.

And the Finnish

small steps

dilemma is by no means

The question still remains as to what she will do if

the EFTA members choose to Join the European economic Community.

"
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How her trading Interests can test be safeguarded In the event
of an enlargement of the EEC Is a future problem for

Finland.

Until the shape of that Community Is established such a question cannot be
The Euro;Cirl t o

y>

'
1
.

~

n

.

answered.
r

Economl

c

Communl ty

.

Sweden

.

Austria and

The establishment of thr European Economic

Community in 1957 under the guidelines of the Treaty of Home

represented the culmination of the "Community method."

Tt

also represented, a unique chapter In the history of European

Integration.
of Germany,

The sly nations of France, the Federal Republic

Belgium, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands

took the first step toward full economic and, hopefully,

political Integration of Europe.

For the first time, agree-

ment between several nations of Europe established a common

market under a supra-national authority.
The EEC was not to

economic union.

be only a customs union but a full

Such a union requires common policies for

agriculture, social affairs, transport and energy, a common
trade policy, common rules ensuring fair competition, freedom
of movement for workers, goods and services and the harmoni-

zation of fiscal, monetary and financial policies.

1

commission

was established of representatives from the six countries to

oversee and Implement the organizations activities.

m he

Commission holds responsibility for Initiating association

11 ?

agreements with. other nations of the world.
represent the

’’Six”

trade and tariffs.

It also Is to

In negotiations concerning International

Decisions made by the Commission, whether

they be economic or political, are held to be

Member States.

binding on all

Though the main emphasis of the Community is

on economic Integration,

the ultimate objective is the politi-

cal unification of Europe.

The six nations which signed thr

Treaty of Rome in 1957 fully understood and intended that to
be their goal.

While the creation of the EEC was a hi story -making step,
It did divide Europe politically and economically,

Because

thr Treaty of Rome required the sacrifice of some sovereignty

on the part of Members, there were a number of States who

would not join.

.Among these States were the four neutrals

of Sweden, Austria, Switzerland and Finland who for reasons of

neutrality could not agree to the obligations of the Treaty of
Rome.

To do so would limit their independence of action

economically.

Tt might also bind them to certain political

policies which would hinder their neutrality.

.As

was dir.

i

cussed above, these countries, along with Britain, Portugal,

Denmark and Norway, formed the EFTA in hopes of

countering

the economic discrimination of the EEC.
By I960,

it was apparent that the EEC was quickly be-

coming a powerful force within Europe.

Likewise, it was

obvious that several members of

EFT,"

were rot benefiting by

their association with that organization.
true of Britain.

This was especially

She had not joined the EEC because It would

have meant breaking off her ties with the Commonwealth nations

with whom she has a special relationship, both politic and
economic.

But It was now apparent that the Commonwealth and

the rest of the EFTA nations could no longer provide the mar-

kets essential for the rejuvenation of the British economy.

Unless they found new markets for their exports, the British
could not hope to rectify their balance of payments.

This

meant more austerity, more devaluation of the pound and continued economic lag for a nation desiring to re-establish

herself as a major world power.

Given these

circumstances, the Conservative government

of Harold Macmillan decided to

discard the tradition of Iso-

lation from the European continent, as It was no longer feasible
economically.

Consequently, on December 19, 1961, the British

Government formally

applied for full membership In the EEC.

The decision by the British Government and subsequent

applications by Norway and Denmark to the EEC had drastic
effects on the remaining members of EFTA.

If Britain, Norway

and Denmark gained membership In the EEC, It would mean the
end of the EFTA.

Those nations remaining outside the EEC

would then face economic discrimination, a situation that

119

would be hard to endure.

They also would be excluded from

the movement to Integrate Europe on a wider scale.

This

could lead to political Isolation from the rest of Europe
at a time when the political Identity of that Continent

was developing.
The prospect of British membership In the EEC and the

consequences that It held for EFT/ created serious dilemmas
for the European neutrals.

nature of EFTA

,

Because of the non-political

the neutral nations of Austria, Sweden and

Switzerland felt very comfortable In their membership.
a lesser degree so did Finland.

To

Their status of neutrality

thus ensured, they enjoyed the common tariffs and customs
But with the proposed enlargement

of the free trade area.

some EFTA nations, thus wrecking the

of the EEC to Include

latter organization, the neutrals would be again open to

economic discrimination.
of the Treaty of Rome

,

Yet, because of the political nature

they could not be members of the EEC

and maintain their neutrality.
The gravity of the neutrals

1

economic situation can bn

illustrated by examination of their Individual trade statistics.
In

1961, Austrian exports to EFTA and EEC member countries

were 65 per cent of her total while Eastern Europe received
only 1^.6 per cent.

Her dependence on the

West was even

more noticeable for Imports: 72 ‘3 per cent of Austria»s

imports came from

and EEC countries as against only

EFT/'

10.4 per cent from Eastern Europe.

Swiss exports to EFTA

and EEC nations amounted to 59.2 per cent as compared
with
3«° per cent for Eastern Europe.

Her Imports from EEC and

EFTA added up to 75- 2 per cent as against Imports from the

_art at

2

•

3

per cent

Finally, Sweden's economic dependence

•

upon the West Is even more pronounced.

In 1961, Swedish

exports to EEC and EFTA nations amounted to 73.8 per cent of

her total while the Eastern countries took only 4.2 per cent.
The figures for her imports were 68.2 per cent from the EEC

and EFTA versus 4,4 per cent from the Eastern countries.*
These figures Illustrate well that the neutrals are economi-

cally dependent on Western European markets.

More dramatic

are the figures Indicating the amount of trade difference that

exists between the neutrals' Import-export trade to the EEC
and EFTA.

TABLE I**

Austria

Year
1961 Export to EEC

Sweden

49-5*
51%

(1962)

Sw 1 tzerland

*u.5*

33 %

1961 Export to EFTA

57 %

6 5%

52*

1961 Import from EEC

49 . 5 $

40 %

62.5$

1961 Import from EFTA

12.7#

26 .

M ro • 0

"*From CECD Statistical Bulletin, Series A.
##

it

»t

ii

ii
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The significantly higher percentages of trade between
the neutrals and the EEC show that for them to remain outside

the EEC trade markets could be disastrous, especially as

their economies are largely dependent on foreign trade.

Exclusion from the EEC would also mean serious dislocation of
trade for them.
The European neutrals are conscious of their economic

dependence on the West.

But they are also aware of the poli-

tical entrapments contained in EEC membership.

Desiring to

remain neutral and at the same time economically healthy,
the governments of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland sought
a solution to the dilemma created by pending British member-

ship.

The solution which they arrived at was association with

the EEC, provided for in Article 238 of the Treaty of Home.

Article 238 makes provision for the conclusion of association agreements between the community

and third States.

It

reads:
The Community may conclude with a third country,
a union of States or an international organization agreements creating an association embodying reciprocal rights and obligations, Joint
actions and special procedures.

Such agreements shall be concluded by the Council
acting by means of a unanimous vote and after
consulting the Assembly.
This Article was drafted in rather broad terms.

This was done

deliberately so that it may be more useful and valuable by
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what It permits than by what it contains.
It Is so broad,

However, because

It is subject to different Interpretations.

For this reason, the Commission prepared a memorandum on

February 26

,

1959

,

setting down an attitude toward association.

The characteristics of association are: that It is to be

essentially flexible in form and in the connection it may
establish between the Community and the associated State, and
that association must, whatever its form, be directed

toward the guiding objectives laid down In
of the Rome Treaty,

Tt must tend,

.Article Two

therefore, "To promote

throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic
activities, a continuous

and balanced expansion, an increased

stability, an accelerated rising of the standards of living

and closer relations between its member States.

Association provides an alternative to full entry into
the Community

and allows the associated State to establish

an important structural link w^th the Community.

must never be confused with entry.

But it

Professor Hallsteln,

past-president of the Commission, stated that "The creation
of the SEC is a political act.

Those responsible for this

EEC have never hitherto represented any view other than that
the final aim and the real. Justification of their efforts
is the intention of furthering the political unification of

Europe.

.

.Association pursues economic elms ."

0

)

Association, therefore, is an instrument of economic

progress and integration which leaves the associated State
its full political Independence beyond the obligations

actually undertaken.

Association would appear to be the

logical step for those States such as the neutrals who for

political reasons find themselves unable to accept the
rigid and fundamental obligations of membership.
It has become apparent that our discussion of the

neutrals and their association with the EEC does not
include Finland.

The exclusion of Finland from negotiating

with the EEC for associative status is a political reality
of that State*

s

relationship to the Soviet Union, resulting

in rigid neutrality.

Here again, the diversities of neutrality

among the four neutrals become apparent.

Whereas Finland could

pursue association with EFTA, she cannot with the EEC., Whereas
the other three States held full membership in EFTA, because of

their neutrality, they can only apply for association with the
EEC.

And it will become apparent later on in our discussion

of the individual States* positions on the EEC that there are

definite differences between these three States.

(A

State

such as Sweden, which has no legal attachment to neutrality
is more able to consider

Austria or Switzerland.

full membership in the EEC than is

12*1

In December of 1961

,

EEC. and Britain had begun,

after negotiations between the
the three neutrals applied to

the Council of Ministers for the opening of negotiations

concerning their association.
vited. to

They were subsequently in-

present their views on prospective association.

Realizing that they held much in common concerning the EEC,
its aims and the obligations of neutrality, representatives
of the three States met in May, 1962, in Rattvlk,

Sweden,

to discuss common requirements of neutrality and a possible

association with the EEC.

At this conference, the three

nations agreed on five rules required by their common neu-

trality in regard to such association.

It was decided that

they would all emphasize these requirements in their individual hearings before the Community.

These requirements are

as follows:
1.

In the field of foreign trade, neutrality necessi-

tates the preservation of treaty-making powers.

Neutrals

cannot delegate the sovereign right to conclude trade agree-

ments to a supra-national body.

This does not prevent them

from harmonizing their national customs, but neutrality

reasons do prevent their participation In a proper customs

union which would entail the pooling of customs and foreign
trade policy.

2

Neutrals must preserve their freedom of action In

.

case of war or of serious International disturbances.

They

must feel secure in their right to suspend In such cases
their commitments toward the EEC to the ertent they deem
it necessary for neutrality reasons.

They must be able to

decide autonomously In this respect.
3*

The neutrals also feel a qualified need to reserve

their strategic Industries.

They agree not to use neutrality

as a pretext to further or conceal their purely economic

Interests and thus evade the economic commitments.
^

.

Neutrality is furthermore held Incompatible with

irredeemable commitments.

The neutrals require the right

to give notice of dis-association in any scheme of the EEC.
5.

The institutions of the EEC and the Association

treaties would, have to be clearly separated.

The neutral

countries cannot accept majority decisions of the EEC which
O

would submit them to new commitments."
On July 28, 1962, Austria and Sweden presented their

cases before the EEC.

ber 2^, 1962.

Switzerland presented hers on Septem-

All three governments stressed that the

f'1

requirements of neutrality did not prevent close economic
cooperation, and that they were willing to go beyond the

obligations they had assumed under the Stockholm Treaty.

ve
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Individually, they each presented their views on integration
and their specific

memborshi p

.

hesitations regarding neutrality end

The Austrian Government declared:

The State Treaty and proclaimed neutrality
are thus the basis of Austria’s sovereignty
and Independence.
For this reason, the
Austrian Federal Government declared in their
letter of December 12, 1961, that they would
like to enter into an economic agreement with
the European Economic Community, an agreement
which takes account of the maintenance of
Austria’s permanent neutrality and her international agreements. .The Austrian Federal
Government takes the v 1 ew that neutrality
and the obligations under the State Treaty arc
no obstacle for Austria’s participation in the
economic integration of Europe, provided that
account is taken of the two essential preconditions of Austrian foreign policy .the
State Treaty and neutrality ... .^
.

—

In presenting the views of the Swedish government,

Minister of Commerce, M. Gunnar Dange, stressed that Sweden
believed in neither isolation nor disengagement but rather
in the efforts of solidarity.

The Swedes sought within the

framework of this neutrality to associate with pracitcal
efforts of integration.

He stated that:

It is thus not to the economic integration and
what it entails that Sweden’s special position

The cooperation between the member
relates.
States of the European Economic Community also
contains distinctly political features. .there
are, however, a few important features of membership which are not compatible with a policy
For neutrality is not only a
of neutrality.
legal concept but Indeed also a matter of policy.
It' implies a conduct, even in peacetime which
maintains confidence in the determination as
well as the ability to remain neutral in war or
crisis. Without giving up its neutrality Sweden
could in our view not become a full member of
the Community.--^
.
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Finally, the Swiss views were presented by M. Wahlen,

chief of the Federal Political Department.

He stated:

In the arrangements to be concluded with the
Community Switzerland will have, however, to
safeguard her independence her federalist
structure and her system of direct democracy...
I would like to stress again, Switzerland takes
a positive interest in the endeavours made to
unite Europe. .Switzerland is also determined
to do everything in her power, within the framework of her neutrality, to contribute to the
maintenance of peace and liberty in the world ." -

—

.

1

In their statements, all three States clearly recognized the

difficulty of distinguishing between the political,
economic and legal factors underlying their attitudes.

They

also seemed any 1 ous and willing to do more than sign ordinary

trade agreement.

They committed themselves to the task of

making a significant contribution to the work of integration.
They also attempted, to demonstrate that they did not seek

pilvileged positions for themselves and appeared anxious to
keep to a minimum the reservations that they had concerning

association with the EEC.

Yet, all sought to make clear

their continued attachment to neutrality and non-alliance.

Despite all the claims against such an interpretation,

association to a politically oriented organization such as
the EEC does place a different tint on a State’s neutrality.

Participation in an organization whose major goal is eventual

political union can only lead to accusations of partiality

s
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against those States claiming to he neutral.

It was for

this reason that the three neutrals, hoping to stymie any

forthcoming charges of this sort, collectively laid down the

requirements of neutrality.

In this way, they could Justify

their common goal of association with the EEC and avoid any

embarrassing contradictions between them.

Individually,

each sought to Justify its position in respect to the rele-

vant and specific circumstances surrounding its parti
case.

lar

In other words, because each of the three countries

practices a different brand of neutrality ^n
political and

a

different

economic environment, all three governments

argued for association according to its individual circum-

stance

.

Austria and EEC Assoc^ ail on

The Austrian case for

.

association with the EEC stems from its economic, independence upon the Community and its exclusion from full member-

ship because of its neutrality.

stitutes Austria

1

s

Economically, the EEC con-

biggest customer in that she channels to

its members 5 0 per cent of her total exports.. She imports

from these countries at the rate of nearly 60 per cent if

Greece is Included in that figure.

The EEC contains Austria*

biggest single country market, namely, the Federal Republic
of Germany.

country

26

alone.

per cent of Austria*

s

exports go to that

In view of these economic realities, to be

excluded from the EEC would be disastrous for the already

fragile Austrian economy.

Furthermore, In light of the

economic ties between Austria and the Community, for her
to attempt a policy of autarky as a form of

Independence” Is out of the question.

”

economic

Similarly, the mere

maintenance of the present geographic distribution of trade
cannot assure Independence for the Austrians.

This Is

especially true If we consider the Soviet interpretation
of ”a more even balance of

with the Soviet bloc.

trade,” that is, more trade

Such an interpretation would invari-

ably lead to economic and political subservience if Austria

should be discriminated against in important western markets.
Of the three States, Austrian neutrality would appear

to be in the most delicate position and subject to the most

immediate and serious political pressure.

Austria must

maintain and consolidate the international recognition and
acceptance of her status of permanent neutrality.

Moreover,

she must demonstrate to the Soviet Union that the terms and

obligations of the Constitutional Law of Neutrality are being
observed in her foreign relations.

It must also be remembered

that under Article 4 (2) of the State Treaty, Austria is

forbidden from entering into any agreement which would have
the effect, directly or indirectly, 'of promoting either poli-

tical or economic union with Germany.

She has in the past
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received warnings from the Soviet Union which Interprets
the Community as a "military alliance," that association

with the ESC might be construed as an unfriendly or un-

neutral act.

In support of this argument, Professor

Verdross, an authority on .Austrian neutrality, concluded:
"A

permanently neutral State cannot Join a multinational

economic group such as the Common Market because such an

organization alms at fusion of the national economies, and
to this end it deputes authority to a central organ to

follow a united economic policy which Is binding on the

member State.
The Government,

in defending Its position, stated that

while such an attitude

majr be

Justified in the event that

Austria should consider full membership in the EEC, it
does not apply to consideration of an association agreement.

Austria must establish an agreement of an institutional
relationship which will operate only within an exclusive
economic sphere, and which will reserve the right to with-

draw from association status in case of war or threat of
war.

The Austrian spokesmen have made it clear that they

feel in no way obligated to pursue the kind of ideological
and economic neutrality the Soviet Union appears to have in

mind.

It would appear that the law of permanent neutrality,

the basic constraint placed upon Austrian policy, is In no
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way directly relevant to economic policy questions, and that
the obligation to

maintain an Independence In peacetime

which will assure neutrality In the eventuality of
Is difficult to translate Into

a

war

economic terms.

Behind these statements and arguments for association
Is a fundamental Interest in the integration of Europe.

Having already participated in a number of Integration organizations

(EFTA

and Council of Europe), Austria has clearly

demonstrated her interest in such directions.

It is now

hoped -that the practical approach which she takes towards

neutrality (pragmatic adaption to the needs of the day,
national and International) will allow her to take an active
part in EEC.

That the Community represents a threat to

Austria politically and economically is undeniable.

But

it also represents an opportunity to demonstrate to the

international community that neutrality does not have to

mean isolation or Ideological impartiality.
Association with the EEC does not in itself represent
a

threat to Austrian neutrality.

Assuredly, the Austrian

Government will not agree to any measures which violate her
Inde

ience.

The threat to Austrian neutrality rests

the reactions and interpretations of h^r actions in the EEC,

especially those of the Russians.

For if there is any limit-

ation placed upon Austrian foreign policy other than those

.

conta* ned in neutrality, it is certainly those resulting

from Austria*

s

relationship to the Soviet Union.

Sweden and the EEC.

In the case of Sweden, political

and economic considerations alone will determine her de-

cision and method of implementation concerning association

with the EEC.

Unlike Austria and Switzerland, she has no

legal status of neutrality to accommodate.

However, Sweden

does feel that her traditional neutralism is essential for
the maintenance of the political status quo in the Baltic

region.

Thus, her preoccupation to avoid adverse Russian

reactions that

itfould

place Finland in jeopardy is quite

understandable
The record of Swedish participation in the regional

organizations and integration efforts since World War Two
illustrates that the Swedes have consistently supported the

Integration concept.

Her participation in the Marshall Plan,

the OEEC and EFTA demonstrates this clearly.

She was also

instrumental in trying to achieve some reconciliation between
the ’’Sir” and the ’’Seven” in 1958 - 59 *

However, her estrang-

ment from the EEC is understandable in light of her desire
to remain non-aligned and un-involved in political union.

The prospect of finding herself discriminated against
in her Western markets because of British membership in the
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EEC created serious problems for Sweden economically end

politically .

In seeking association with the EEC,

she hopes

to alleviate both of these problems.

Economically, it is a "must” that Sweden find some
sort of accord with the Community.

Sweden is dependent

upon a large amount of foreign trade to sustain her standard
of living

as well

as pay for her huge defense budget.

About

?0 per cent of her exports are to Western European markets,

of which 3 ^

cent go to the EEC countries.

Scrapping

the Western European tariff barriers would consequently mean

an important advantage for Swedish exports if Sweden joins,
the market area and just' as Important

a disadvantage if

she remains outside.

An examination of one of Sweden’s major industries,

paper

and paper goods, illustrates very clearly the signi-

ficance of EEC association to her economy.

The paper industry

in Sweden exports roughly 9 per cent of her total export.

Western Europe is the major market.
exports go to this area.
is:

Four-fifths of the paper-

The breakdown within this market

EEC countries take b8 per cent of paper exports while

the 2FTA takes only 21 per cent.

The Federal Republic of

Germany is the leading customer for these products, followed
by Britain.

To include Britain in the EEC would mean that

Sweden’s two biggest

importers of a major industry would be

.
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discriminating against bar products.

Tt also means that

the EEC would become a shortage area for paper goods, because
the major exporters of these goods, Sweden, Finland and Norway,

would remain outside the enlarged market.

EFTA would become

a surplus area should it be able to continue without Britain.

What is true of the paper industries is also true of other

industries throughout the EFTA countries.

German-owned industries would

Austria’s many

be in the same situation as

Finland’s wood industry and Sweden’s paper industry.

Some

amount of urgency was added to the Swedish Situation when
in 1962

r,

-"ecess^on set in, causing many Swedish factories

and manufacturing companies to begin plans for some sort of

relationship with the EEC.

This was especially true of her

distributing firms.
The debate surrounding the political consequences of

Sweden’s negotiations with the EEC ranged from those advocating full membership and those in favor of association to
those arguing for strict observance of neutrality, which

would mean disengagement from the EEC altogether.

Advocates

of full membership argued that Swedish neutrality was not

legal status and, therefore, very flexible.

They pointed

to the fact that the realization of the political aims of

the Rome Treaty had yet to be instituted, and that the

federalists within the ESC had lost the initiative.

They

a

.
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also pointed out that the political cooperation which the

heads of government of the six States Intend to develop has,
therefore, been kept outside the Treaty and the Institutions
of the EEC.

Finally, they felt that membership and association

might both tie Sweden a bit, but full membership would give
her Influence In that body.
The arguments against

full membership were clearly

enumerated by Prime Minister Erlander In a speech before
the Congress of the Steel Metal Workers Union on .August 22,

1961.

Excerpts from his speech Include:
....For us to be able to satisfy as far as
we possibly can our foreign policy Investment, we
need a certain degree of freedom of movement both
In practice and as laid down by formal agreements.
Freedom from alliances Is an Important and substantial part of this freedom of movement but It
must be supported by a persistent effort to avoid
any commitment even outside the sphere of military
poll cy . .
.

On why the Rome Treaty would Jeopardize Swedish neutrality:

....There would be far-reaching consequences for
Sweden were she to accept such a trade policy; It
would mean that In this sphere It would no longer
be possible for Sweden to pursue an Independent
policy. A consequence of our joining would be
that a supranational Institution would be authorized to direct Swedish trade policy In a way that
was a complete departure from our commercial
policy hitherto....
On Swedish neutrality and European cooperation:

....If Sweden Is to maintain a policy of neutrality
she cannot subscribe to such a political goal for
European cooperation. I have stressed on previous
occasions that we must avoid commitments restricting our chances of enlisting confidence In our
policy of neutrality....
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....It would be extremely unfortunate if
the idea were to spread that we felt so
threatened by the economic consequences
of exclusion from European cooperation
that we were prepared to sacrifice what
for so many years has been the main line
of Swedish foreign policy ... 13

Those who debated for disengagement altogether cited
the need to maintain the statue quo in the Baltic area.

They also felt that any departure from the strict practice
of neutrality could only endanger that policy and thus

leave Sweden open to criticism and vulnerable to

attack

in time of war.

The decision for association with the EEC represented
a

compromise between these two extremes, plus the realities

of economic isolation.

In her arguments before the Community,

the Swedish government laid stress on the limitation of her

freedom to suspend or withdraw from her obligations in time
of crisis or war and the freedom to sign agreements with

third parties in her own name.

In this manner,

Sweden

demonstrated the flexibility in her policy of neutrality and
her continued practice of pragmatism in foreign affairs.
,

It is evident that Sweden has a bit more leeway in

her practice o^ neutrality than does Austria.

direct result

o**

the absence of any leg 0

neutrality in the Swedish past.

'
1

This is

a.

commitments to

It is also a reflection of

the fact that Sweden does not operate under the direct

influence of the Soviet Union.

Her neutrality and Inde-

pendence are not directly related to satisfying the interests
of the Soviets other than those concerning the Finns.

In the

Swedish case, the only pressures exerted upon her neutrality
come from domestic sources as was evident in the debate over

full membership into the EEC.

The fact that there was

considerable pressure in favor of full membership illustrates
that Swedish adherence to neutrality is more or less of her

own making.

It also demonstrates that any major movements to

further the integration of Europe in the future might look
to the Swedes to set the example for neutral participation.
'

Swl tzcrland and the EEC.

The prospect of association

with the EEC raises some important questions and dilemmas for
the Swiss in their neutrality policy.

Most significant of

these concerns the rather narrow interpretation that the Swiss

have developed toward their participation in international

organizations.

It is to be remembered that under the guide-

lines of their pronouncements on neutrality in 195^. the Swiss

maintain that neutrals should avoid, whenever possible, membership or cooperation with intergovernmental organizations,

because it is likely to Involve the neutral in political
activities.

The Swiss have stayed close to such an interpre-

tation by remaining outside the United Nations.
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However, there have been Instances where Switzerland
has abandoned such a narrow view.

These hove occurred In

the movement to unify Europe, although here we do find

Inconsistencies.

The Swiss participated In OEEC and EFTA

,

both pure economic organizations, with little hesitancy.

Their reluctance to join the Council of Europe, even after
the British had successfully eliminated any political de-

cision

making power from It, once again Is a display of

strict observance of the 195^ guidelines.

When the Issue of association arose as a result of the

British attempt to join the EEC, the request by the Swiss
for some sort of cooperation came as a surprise to many

observers of Swiss politics.

(Her subsequent membership In

the Council of Europe In 1963 added to the list of surprises.)

Because the EEC was supposedly so politically oriented, It
was expected that the Swiss would adopt the narrow inter-

pretation of neutrality.

However, there wore other over-

riding circumstances and considerations to her dilemma.
The first of these considerations was her geographic

position vis-a-vis the EEC nations and the economic conse-

quences resulting from an Isolationist policy.

Geographically,

Switzerland is In the middle of the EEC countries.

Not only

are her major trade channels through two EEC countries, Italy

and Wdst German, but she has a growing dependence on foreign
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labor, mostly Italian.

Were she to remain outside the

EEC area altogether, the clauses in the Home Treaty on
the restrictions of labor could cut into her supply.

A

continued isolation by the Swiss who occupy a central

position in Europe could also lead to accusations that
her neutrality no longer served "in the interest of Europe."
The most pressure upon Switzerland
be of an economic nature.

would appear to

Her growing trade links with

Germany and Italy, and the fact that two-thirds of her
foreign trade is with the countries of Western Europe carry

considerable weight for association.

The discrepancy be-

tween her trade figures for the EEC and EFTA are even more
revealing.

While 63 per cent of her total imports come from

the EEC countries,

only 12 per cent are from the EFTA

.

Export figures range from 42 per cent for the EEC to only
16 per cent for the EFTA,.

Of the three neutrals, the Swiss’

trade with the Eastern European nations and the Soviet Union

combined receive only 3*6 per cent of Swiss exports while
Imports from those nations barely total 2.5 per cent.

As a

result, the economic considerations do deserve significant

attention in the Swiss decision.
Against this must be set her desire to adhere to the

classical status of neutralization and to avoid commit-

ments devolving from participation in certain types of
international organizations.

Switzerland also felt that her

unique position in the field of mediation and good offices

might suffer in the event of association with the Community.
It is for this reason that the Swiss approach to the EEC
is a cautious one.

Yet,

it would seem that in order to

preserve her special status, it is necessary only for her
to

conclude such terms with the Community which would allow

her to carry out the beneficial duties of a neutral in time
of war.

It is rather

difficult to see how her sovereign

independence or her neutrality would he threatened by a
limited participation in the efforts of the Community, given

adequate limitations in the association agreement to cover
her major preoccupation of neutrality.
There does remain one obstacle concerning economic

cooperation between the EEC and Switzerland.

Because the

Swiss Federal -constitution gives important economic powers
to the cantons which the Federal Government ca.nnot of its

own volition and without complex internal procedures bargain
away, any agreement would have to take into account the

division of powers between the Confederate and Cantonal
authorities in so far as the implementation of Community

policy is concerned.

1^1
£2T. c1v
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not yet clear how the problem of

the neutrals and their relation to the SEC will be
solved.
The Community Itself has yet to agree on Its policy
and seems

unlikely to do so until the Issues surrounding British

membership are eliminated.

The two French vetoes toward

Britain’s gaining access in 1963 and again in 1966 have for
the time being delayed the break-up of the EFTA organization.
Thus, they also put off the dilemmas facing the neutrals in

the event of such an occurrence.

But now that General

De Gaulle has departed from the European scene, the prospects

for British entry are again bright.
1

.Again,

the neutral

ssue is sure to be raised.

Meanwhile, there have been currents against the Inclusion
of neutral nations in the efforts of European integration
and in the EEC in particular.

The early 1960 ’s found Under-

secretary of State for the United States, George Ball, raising
serious objections about the neutrals and their intentions.
He charged that they would hide behind their neutrality, thus

protecting themselves from any political involvement in
European affairs while reaping the economic benefits of

association with the Community.
ients

His charge found ready recip-

among several Community representatives, notably

Professor Hallstein and Paul-Henri Bpaak.

Showing signs of

.

impatience with neutrality, they claimed the neutral
countries should either come or stay out.
The neutrals reacted, to such charges in typical

fashion.

The Swiss were especially adamant about Secre-

tary Ball*

g

statements.

accusation.
In retort,

They felt endangered, by his

they claimed that they

neutral, and that Europe cannot be without them.

are the
The

Austrians stated that they were only considering association as

a

means of maintaining a link w*th the Western

world, and that they had no plans for isolation from their

ideological commitments to neutrality and democracy.

The

Swedes felt less endangered by these charges, because', as
has been stated, theirs is

a

more elastic form of neutrality

and Is, therefore, in better position to cope with such

circumstances
There is one final point that illustrates best the

objective of this discussion.

At the time or the first

British application to the EEC, the EFT/ countries signed
an agreement known as the London Declaration of June, 19 6l,

which bound them to not sign any agreements with the Community
until all of their number were assured of attaining satisfactory arrangements.

The neutrals in particular were

adamant in presenting a common front to the EEC as was
expressed by their collaboration on the requirements of

neutrality.

after the French vetoed the British appli-

But,

cation in 1963, It

x-ras

decided that each country should

negotiate individually with the Community.

This was

a

result of the realization on the part of those countries
that British membership did not automatically mean that they

would ride her coattails into the Community as they had
thought.

-Among the neutrals,

differences in the practice

of neutrality made only the broadest guidelines possible.

For .Sweden to be excluded because the Swiss take a narrow

Interpretation of neutrality and international organizations
was proven to be as absurd as if Finland should demand that
no neutral could join the EEC if she, because of her neutrality,

could not.

Consequently, any re-opening of negotia-

tions with the EEC will be done individually, with each

country bargaining on its own basis, tantamount to its own
interests and circumstances.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION
This study has

had several, hut limited objectives.

First, through the discussion of neutrality and Its his-

torical evolution, it was demonstrated that there had

occurred several significant changes in the concept, many
of them since the end of the First World War.

The chief

responsibility for those changes lies with the establishment of a collective security system, (League of Nations
and the United Nations) where neutrality was practically
outlawed; and the arrival of the cold war *n international

politics,

Also illustrated by such a discussion was the

fact that there has been and remains today

a

discrepancy

between neutrality in coded law and in actual practice. In
other words, States which

desire to practise

a foreign

policy urder the guidelines of neutrality do not operate
in a political vacuum.

Their attempts to adhere strictly

to the coded laws of neutrality will be thwarted by politi-

cal pressures, both internal and external, upon them.

As

a result, there exist in practice many different degrees

and levels of neutrality, continually evolving and changing

relative to the shape of the international community and its

political power structure.

It would seem,

then, that neu-

trality means different things at different stages in time.
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second objective has been to demonstrate some different

levels of neutrality by examining the Individual policies of
four European neutrals.

By means of a discussion on their

relationship to International political pressures In general
and then on the specific pressures generated by the Issue of

European Integration, significant differences were found to
exist between these four States in regard to their orientation, guidelines and practice of neutrality.

These differ-

ences exist despite many commonalities among them such as
Ideology, polltica

graphic pool tion.

-1

orientation, culture and race, and geo-

Overriding these common features are

geographic position relative to the two

cold,

war blocs, pre-

sence or absence of legal attachment or obligation to neutrality,

domestic make-up, credibility

ment to such

a

foreign policy.

of neutrality, and commit-

These forces were found to be

Instrumental in shaping the individual policies of neutrality
in the four European States.
It was also

demonstrated that neutrality

1

n the cold war

actually places a nation between the two contending power
blocs.

In many cases, this results In their becoming a pawn

in the struggle, subject to political pressure from the two
sides, both tugging and enticing the neutral to moderate or

abandon its perilous and insecure position for the relative
security of the power bloc.

Austria and Finland are excellent

146

examples of such a situation.
selves In an
struggle.

None of the neutrals find them-

Isolated position vis-a-vis the East-West

Indeed, the large number of articles entitled

between East and West’ points up the neutrals*

”

position in international politics.
nations.)

(Fit in any of the four

Here again Is an Illustration that the original

definition of neutrality, meaning isolation from ideological
and political conflict no longer applies.

With the evolve-

ment of the cold war and neutralism, the concept of traditional

neutrality may only exist in the event of a
ever,

even this possibility

nuclear annlhlliatlon.

1

s

"hot" war.

How-

threatened by the prospect of

In such a case,

there does not seem

to be any place for impartiality or isolation.

The final and most important objective has been to explain
the neutral*

s

position relative to European unification.

We

have not attempted to answer the major question as to whether
the neutral States'

roles in European integration constitute

a help or an hindrance toward the final goal of political

unification.

Such a question initiates an on-going and open-

ended debate which cannot begin to be settled until there is

agreement within Europe on the character and scope of the
final solution.
Koi\r ever,

major debate.

we might at this time take a quick look at th* s

Basically, it

breaks down into two sides.

On

one s1.de are those who argue that the neutrals constitute
a major hindrance to European Integration simply because

they have an overriding commitment to neutrality.

In the

final solution of European unity, there can be no neutrality,

and that for these nations to benefit from the fruits

of what limited Integration has taken place (economic) while

showing no Indication of any sort that they intend to sacrifice any of their sovereignty or Independence is simply
not acceptable.

They

also argue that by maintaining a

commitment to neutrality, these States undermine the principles
of integration because they demonstrate a lack of faith In

the possibilities of such

support to those f orces

, ,

a goal.

Finally, they also lend

while not neutral, which are opposed

to the concept of a united Europe.

On the other hand,

the neutrals argue that those who

accuse them of a demeaning intent do not understand or com-

prehend the circumstances of neutrality.

They suggest that

until agreement is reached on the final solution to integration,
one that would guarantee them security and stability, they

have a right to participate in the limited cooperation which

now exists.

To deny them this would mean, in the end, to

deny them any role in a united Europe.

For to expect that

the neutrals would join in the final solution of an integrated

Europe, having been denied no ties or participation previously,

148
Is absurd.

Not only does it take time and effort to integrate

economic and political systems, but there must be a number of

precedents established for such action.

The neutrals also

maintain that they aid the integration movement by providing
places for moderation, compromise and good offices.

Although we have not attempted to deal directly with
this debate. Indirectly we have confronted it.

The discussion

on the problems and dilemmas confronting the neutrals by the

integration movement focused our attention on the fact that
the neutrals have changed and moderated their stand on neu-

trality in response to the circumstances and demands made upon
them.

Surely Finland challenged the

M Paaslkivi

line” of

appeasing the Soviet Union when she sought association with
the EFTA

.

Austria' also endangered her neutrality when she

asked for association with the EEC.

(Since that time, the

Soviet Union has made it clear that she would not let Austria
join the EEC.)

However, for the most part, these moderations

have been rather insignificant to

trality.

raanj

critics of the neu-

Their case is bolstered by the fact that the failure

of the British to be admitted into the EEC in 1963 and 1966

has sufficiently put off any further adjustment that the neu-

trals might have to make.
settled,

Until the British question is

the neutrals are in a relatively secure position.

Finally, through our discussion of the neutrals and the
EFTA and EEC, It Is hoped that we may be able to see some kind
of precedent being set In the event of Erltlsh membership.

Here

again, we face an open-ended question.

In light of

the changes which have occurred in the last ten years regarding

European integration and the cold war, and in regard to any
special circumstances surrounding eventual British membership, we have only the foundations of these States* neutrality

and their experiences of the early 1960*s to enable us to

understand their actions concerning European unity.
is,

I\

s it

It is far too little for any kind of authoritative pre-

diction.
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